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ABSTRACT  
 
The current refugee crisis has created an influx of refugees, primarily in the developing 
world, which has caused an issue of burden-sharing amongst the global North and South.  
Some states are hindered in their capacity to offer assistance and protection while other 
states avoid participating in the refugee realm all together.  Repatriation remains the only 
solution for the majority of refugees and can occur after residing for short or long periods 
of time in the host country.  Voluntary repatriation is a key element to the foundation of 
international refugee law.  The concept‟s basis lies in the notion of “voluntariness” 
resulting in its promotion as the ideal solution to solve refugee problems.  The current 
criteria for the promotion of repatriation programs, as outlined by UNHCR and 
monitored by states, are based solely on their objective perspectives.  The failure to 
include the subjective perspective of the refugee undermines voluntary repatriation not 
only of its voluntary nature but also as a durable solution.  The decision to voluntarily 
repatriate should be based on the refugees‟ own criteria, not those which are dictated by 
states and other stakeholders.  The absence of the refugee perspective has led to the 
present day situation in which states interpret refugee law for themselves, using acts of 
coercion, persuasion, encouragement and other methods to force refugees home under the 
auspices of voluntary repatriation.  The designation of such objectivity as the primary 
decision-making factor in refugee protection has led to the erosion of the entire 
international refugee law regime.  
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“You see, refugees are just like you and me.  Except for one thing.  Everything they once had has been left 
behind.  Home, family, possessions, all gone.  They have nothing.  And nothing is all they‟ll ever have 
unless we extend a helping hand.”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The current discourse in international refugee law revolves around the common 
viewpoint that refugee law is “not in firm commitments to durable refugee protection.”2 
This stems from the argument that the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
and 1967 Protocol
3
 and refugee law norms are rooted in the post-WWII and Cold War era 
and are no longer relevant to the causes for refugee protection today.
4
  Some posit that 
the refugee regime is in “crisis”5 while others affirm the need to “acknowledge the 
distinction between legal standards and policy recommendations” because we cannot 
make states “respect norms that they have not accepted.”6  General observations of 
international refugee law conclude that it is “increasingly not respected”7 and that the 
current practice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees‟ (UNHCR) 
maintenance of refugee protection “cannot substitute for effective action, political will 
and full cooperation on the part of States”8 since refugee protection is state responsibility.  
According to UNHCR, in 2009 there were over 16 million refugees with more 
than 26 million displaced individuals.
9
  The number of protracted refugee situations 
                                                 
1
As quoted by UNHCR in Nezvat Soguk, States and Strangers; Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft, 
28 (University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
2
Michael Barutciski, Involuntary Repatriation when Refugee Protection is no Longer Necessary: Moving 
Forward after the 48
th
 Session of the Executive Committee, 10 INT‟L J. REFUGEE L. 252 (1998). 
3
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 
[hereinafter 1951 Convention] at art. 33 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 
606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
4
supra note 2. 
5
James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve, Making International Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for 
Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J., 115 (1997).  
6
supra note 2 at 253. 
7
Id. at 238. 
8
[hereinafter UNHCR].  Para. (d) “emphasizes that refugee protection is primarily the responsibility of 
States, and that UNHCR's mandated role in this regard cannot substitute for effective action, political will, 
and full cooperation on the part of States, including host States and countries of origin, as well as other 
international organizations, and the international community as a whole,” as described in UNHCR 
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 81 (XLVIII), 48
th
 Sess., UN doc. A/AC.96/895, 20 Oct. 1997,  
9
UNHCR, UNHCR Annual Report Shows 42 Million People Uprooted Worldwide, (16 June 2009) 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4a2fd52412d.html. 
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across the globe increased from 22 in 1999 to 30 in 2008.
10
  The majority of refugees 
originate from the developing world.  The majority of states hosting large refugee 
populations are located in the developing world.  Between the years of 1997-2001 these 
countries hosted more than 66% of the individuals of concern to UNHCR.
11
  It is 
primarily these developing countries that use their fears of national security issues as a 
justification to involuntarily repatriate refugees.
12
  They also blame the heavy burden that 
flows of refugee populations place on their local resources and the high costs of 
providing aid and protection.  Unfortunately, solidarity efforts between states and the 
international community to address these problems have thus far proved to be fairly 
ineffective.
13
  There has been a recent shift in focus from examining the consequences of 
conflict to analyzing the root causes so that “international refugee protection can be 
reconceived to minimize conflict with the legitimate migration control objectives of 
states, and dependably and equitably to share responsibilities and burdens.”14  While the 
direction in which international refugee law is heading remains uncertain, it is important 
to maintain focus on its intent: to respect state sovereignty while affording protection to 
the persecuted.   
Upon arrival, refugees are often treated as “others” in the host society; they are 
strangers, unequal to their host counterpart, never fully able to cross the threshold of 
acceptance.  Their only hope lies with UNHCR‟s “durable solutions:” resettlement to a 
third country, integration within the host country or repatriation to country of origin.
15
  
Unfortunately, resettlement is considered a conservative solution afforded to few, leaving 
repatriation and integration as the only reality for most refugees.  However, as host states 
                                                 
10
Samuel K. M. Agblorti, Refugee integration in Ghana: The Host Community‟s Perspective, 1 (UNHCR 
New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 203, 2001). 
11
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of 
Concern, (May 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4124b6a04.html. 
12
The more recent trend of mass influxes causes a great deal of concern due to the mix of individuals which 
are included in these groups: asylum-seekers who are protected under the 1951 Convention, others in need 
of international protection as well as those who fall within the Convention‟s exclusion clauses. 
13
These include: collectivized administration, operational burden sharing, responsibility sharing and 
repatriation and development assistance as described in Hathaway et al., supra note 5 at 145. 
14
Id. at 118. 
15
The UN Refugee Agency, Durable Solutions, UNHCR, (2010), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cf8.html. 
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often implement laws and policies to mitigate challenges
16
 posed by refugees, integration 
is a nearly impossible solution as it fails to bestow rights equal to those of citizens of the 
asylum state and path to citizenship.  Governments often use refugees as scapegoats for 
economic and social hardships as well as crimes (theft, prostitution and illegal trading 
across borders) which leaves the host environment hostile in the reception of refugees in 
their communities.
17
  Thus, repatriation is often perceived as the only viable option, and 
the most preferred solution, when the circumstances in the home country have improved 
significantly.  Although, it too possesses various challenges and risks.  
The UNHCR Executive Committee‟s Conclusion No. 74 recognizes that it is 
essential for rehabilitation, reconstruction and national reconciliation to be addressed in 
both a comprehensive and effective manner if repatriation is to be a sustainable and thus 
truly durable solution to refugee problems.
18
  While UNHCR‟s handbook, Voluntary 
Repatriation: International Protection, states that “repatriation which is voluntary is far 
more likely to be lasting and sustainable,”19 states continue to divert from the 
“voluntariness” character of the principle of voluntary repatriation.  Voluntary 
repatriation is not legally-binding as “it does not represent a universal obligation that 
States have actually assumed,”20 rather it is a policy recommendation derived “from the 
text of the UNHCR Statute, not from the Refugee Convention which binds States.”21  
States have thus “mistakenly felt free to impose sometimes sweeping restrictions on 
                                                 
16
These challenges are often perceived to be social, economic and political.  
17
Gaim Kibreab, Revisiting the Debate on People, Place, Identity and Displacement, 12 J. REFUGEE STUD. 
400 (1999). 
18
 Executive Committee, Sess. 55
th
, Conclusion 74 (XLV) on Legal Safety Issues in the Context of Voluntary 
Repatriation of Refugees, (2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/417527674.html. 
19“Reaffirming that voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement are the traditional solutions for 
refugees, and that all remain viable and important responses to refugee situations; reiterating that voluntary 
repatriation, where and when feasible, remains the preferred solution in the majority of refugee situations; 
and noting that a combination of solutions, taking into account the specific circumstances of each refugee 
situation, can help achieve lasting solutions,  Reaffirming the voluntary character of refugee repatriation, 
which involves the individual making a free and informed choice through, inter alia, the availability of 
complete, accurate and objective information on the situation in the country of origin; and stressing the 
need for voluntary repatriation to occur in and to conditions of safety and dignity.” Id. 
20
Barutciski, supra note 2 at 250. 
21
James C. Hathaway, The Rights of States to Repatriate Former Refugees, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
189 (2005).  
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freedom of movement, access to employment and other protected interest and left to their 
devices to decide how refugee repatriation should be structured.”22   
According to the 1951 Convention‟s Article 33, refugees are defined as ex 
definitio or unrepatriable persons; this prohibits states from forcibly returning refugees, 
otherwise known as refoulement.
23
  Through the recognition of the principle of non-
refoulement in international customary law, all countries are bound, regardless of 
ratification status, to this principle.
24
  It is only with the implementation of one of the 
1951 Convention‟s cessation clauses that refugees lose their protection but until then they 
“are entitled to benefit from dignified rights-regarding protection until and unless 
conditions in the State of origin permit repatriation without the risk of persecution.”25  
Therefore, if the situation is not covered by a cessation clause, return cannot be forced by 
the state.
26
        
In 2008, after almost two decades, the Ghanaian government determined the 
conditions in Liberia suitable enough for Liberian refugees in the Buduburam Refugee 
Settlement to return home.  This decision was relayed to the refugees through a camp 
invasion by Ghanaian forces, resulting in the detainment of hundreds of women and men, 
physical and verbal abuse and in some cases, deportation.  The tension and fears that 
enveloped the camp led many Liberian refugees to register with UNHCR‟s voluntary 
repatriation program.  Narratives conducted during a two-week time period in Monrovia, 
Liberia elaborate on the situation of the camp at the time and the experiences of eleven 
former refugees.  Their stories illustrate that while they may not have been ready to return 
to Liberia they felt as though they were left with no other choice but to voluntarily 
repatriate as they feared their lives were in greater danger if they remained in Ghana. 
The voluntary nature of repatriation is established as “an inherent safeguard 
against forced return.”27  However, currently no real requirements or measurements exist 
to determine the degree of “voluntariness” of repatriation because of the inability to 
                                                 
22
James C. Hathaway, Meaning of Repatriation, 9 INT‟L J. REFUGEE L. 554 (1997).  
23
1951 Convention, supra note 3. 
24
L. Catherine Currie, The Vanishing Hmong: Forced Repatriation to an Uncertain Future, 34 N.C.J. INT'L 
L. & COM. 340 (2008). 
25
supra note 22 at 551.   
26
Barutciski, supra note 2 at 249.  
27
G.S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 274(Oxford University Press 1996). 
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determine whether or not a return is truly based on an individual‟s own self-will to 
voluntarily repatriate.  Once the host state concludes that there have been significant 
improvements then it is within its right to eliminate refugee status.
28
  However, many of 
these circumstances and decisions are based on the objective perspectives of the state and 
do not reflect the refugees‟ subjective perspectives or their notion of “home.”  Refugees 
have their own voice and often their own set of criteria for return which are not reflected 
in that outlined by UNHCR and host states.  The absence of fora for refugees to voice 
their concerns and opinions frequently results in their hesitation or resistance when faced 
with the decision to repatriate.  Such reluctance, along with a state‟s unwillingness to host 
refugees for short or even long periods of time, often leads to harassment, discrimination, 
refoulement and acts of encouragement or persuasion by government officials to “push” 
refugees to return to their countries of origin.  As state attitudes shift in refugee law, 
authorities have begun to rely solely on objective factors, rather than a combination of 
both the subjective and objective perspective, deeply crippling the principle of voluntary 
repatriation.  This paper asserts that while repatriation is based on its “voluntariness,” 
host states‟ objective perceptions commonly result in the forcible return of refugees to 
their home states under the guise of voluntary repatriation.  
Part I presents the history of durable solutions and the legal framework of 
voluntary repatriation including the role of UNHCR in the implementation of this 
solution.  It identifies and examines the difficulties and challenges of voluntary 
repatriation in refugee law.  Part II analyzes the subjective and objective perspectives of 
international refugee law to elucidate the state‟s ability to create higher and lower 
thresholds of requirements, reflective of these perspectives, in order to abstain from or 
evade refugee protection.  Part III offers a brief background on Liberia‟s history, its civil 
conflicts and the situation in the Buduburam refugee settlement for Liberian refugees.  
This section also discusses the events which led up to the mass repatriation program in 
April 2008.  Narratives are then provided to offer agency to the refuge voice, by 
illustrating the refugees‟ subjective perspective of life in Ghana.  Through state practice it 
                                                 
28
B.S. Chimni, From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable 
Solutions to Refugee Problems, 7 (UNHCR News in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 2, 2004). 
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is evident that these voices are ignored in current policies.  Their stories and experiences 
exemplify the necessity to include such perspectives in policy-making if repatriation is to 
remain a durable solution.  Part IV offers some suggested policy changes and 
recommendations for all stakeholders in the refugee field to consider before promoting 
repatriation programs.  They also address some of the gaps within the concept of 
voluntary repatriation and the entire realm of refugee law.  Part V summarizes the 
problems with voluntary repatriation, its “incoherence as a legal standard”29 in today‟s 
world, and the inability for refugee law to continue in its current state if it is to realize its 
fundamental purpose.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
Barutscki, supra note 2 at 249. 
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II. REPATRIATION AS A DURABLE SOLUTION 
 
A. History of Durable Solutions 
The concept of durable solutions was first introduced in the post-WWII era to 
address the mass numbers of refugees in Europe.  From 1945 to 1985, resettlement was 
the most promoted solution in practice to address the needs of refugees across the globe 
even though repatriation was viewed as the preferred solution.
30
  It was only at the 
beginning of the Cold War era that the right for an individual “to flee from political 
persecution and to choose where he or she wanted to live was recognized.”31   
It was not until the late 1980s that states began to actively promote voluntary 
repatriation as the response to solve the increasing global refugee problem.  In 1983, 
voluntary repatriation officially acquired an „absolute character‟ through those 
resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly which focused specifically on 
refugees.
32
  The 1990s was declared the “decade of voluntary repatriation” due to the 
increase of civil conflicts in Southeast Asia and Africa.  During this time, voluntary 
repatriation became “the durable solution, with an emphasis on ensuring the voluntary 
character of repatriation.”33  Whilst voluntary repatriation has remained the durable 
solution ever since, it is the one in which the UNHCR, states and the international 
community have had “the greatest limitations of mandate, influence, time and 
resources.”34   
B. The Legal Framework of Voluntary Repatriation 
1. The Legal Language 
 
In international human rights law, the principle of voluntary repatriation is the 
basic right to return to one‟s own country.35  During the period in which the 1951 
                                                 
30
supra note 28 at 1. 
31
Id. at 3. 
32
Id. at 2. 
33
Id. at 1. 
34
Id. at 2. 
35
UNHCR, Handbook: Voluntary Repatriation and International Protection, Sec. 2.1. (1996). 
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Convention was drafted, refugee law was “firmly wedded to an exilic bias”36 and thus the 
idea of repatriation as being of a voluntary nature was obsolete in the language of the 
1951 Convention.  Since the concept of “voluntariness” did not make it into the legal 
framework of refugee protection the task of ensuring state adherence to the idea was 
assigned to the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the predecessor to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  When the IRO dismantled and 
UNHCR was formed, the concept of voluntary repatriation was the main principle 
outlined in its mandate.  The preamble of this statute also called upon states to assist the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees to promote the voluntary repatriation of 
refugees.
37
 
The General Assembly‟s Resolution 428(V) of 14 December 1950, adopting the 
UNHCR Statute, requests governments to cooperate with the High Commissioner by 
assisting in efforts to promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees.
38
  Voluntary 
repatriation should be facilitated by “providing for the protection of refugees by assisting 
governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation as a solution:”39 
 Repatriation should be voluntary. 
 UNHCR, governments and private organizations (NGOs) have a joint role 
to play in voluntary repatriations. 
 Voluntary repatriations should be both facilitated and promoted.40 
It was not until thirty years later that the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner‟s Programme closely examined voluntary repatriation for the first time.  
Their analysis resulted in the drafting of Conclusion 18 (XXXI) which states the 
desirability for UNHCR to be involved in the process of repatriation.  Conclusion 18 both 
consents to and outlines the primary role of UNHCR in regards to voluntary repatriation: 
to maintain the voluntary character of repatriation, assist and cooperate with governments 
in the facilitation of those refugees who wish to repatriate, to provide guarantees by the 
country of origin, to monitor the country of origin and any substantial changes that may 
                                                 
36
Chimni, supra note 28. 
37
Id. at 6. 
38
UNHCR, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, General Assembly 
Resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950, available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c39e1.html. 
39
Id. at Par. 8(c). 
40
supra note 35 at Sec. 1.1. 
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be fundamental to the well-being of refugees, advise refugees on the conditions of the 
home country and the guarantees that have been laid out, and to receive, monitor and 
assist returnees in their reintegration in the country of origin.
41
 
Five years later, the Executive Committee re-examined voluntary repatriation and 
adopted Conclusion 40 (XXXVI) which reiterated the basic doctrine of protection for 
refugees and principles for the promotion of voluntary repatriation.  Conclusion 40 
further instilled the important role that UNHCR plays in refugee situations and the need 
for unhindered access, in both the state of origin and the state of asylum, to the 
populations of concern.  Other important points which stemmed from this included: to 
maintain “the possibility of repatriation „under active review‟ from the outset of a refugee 
situation” and to pursue the promotion, when appropriate, of a solution.42  From this, 
UNHCR‟s mandate expanded to include the assistance in reintegration and rehabilitation 
of returnees and to act as a mediator and promote dialogue between all stakeholders.  
Conclusion 40 also emphasizes the continual need for repatriation to remain of a 
voluntary character under conditions of absolute safety and dignity. 
UNHCR‟s Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation confirms that in order for safe 
repatriation to exist three requirements must be satisfied: safety guaranteed by the law, 
physical safety and material security.
43
  The former two are usually “easier” to ensure 
while the latter is nearly impossible and is also one of the factors which hampers the 
promotion and facilitation of repatriation.  Material security includes access to land and 
opportunities to acquire and sustain a livelihood.  Many countries of origin have engaged 
in years of armed conflict, thus resulting in the destruction of a majority of the 
infrastructure.  These states face difficulties providing basic services, lack progress in 
development, and educational and employment opportunities for returnees.  Security 
concerns are also an apprehension for many refugees when considering a return home.
44
  
It is difficult to promote repatriation when these still unstable countries are at risk of 
                                                 
41
Executive Committee 31
st
 session, U.N.G.A., No. 18 (XXXI), 1980. 
42
Executive Committee 36th session, U.N.G.A. No. 40 (XXXVI), Oct. 1985. 
43
Frederiek De Vlaming, Guidelines for NGOs in Relation to Government Repatriation Projects, 11 J. OF 
REFUGEE STUD. 184 (1998). 
44
UNHCR, supra note 11. 
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renewed violence or are unable to provide basic services and methods of income-
generating support to returnees.    
2. UNHCR’s Role in Voluntary Repatriation 
 
The primary responsibility for managing refugee crises lies in the hands of states 
who must work together to provide effective protection and standards of safety for all 
refugees.  States must cooperate with each other and form partnerships to devise both 
legal and practical measures when responding to refugee situations until appropriate and 
sustainable solutions can be found.  Unfortunately, this is not often the case and UNHCR 
has thus needed to step in to fill the gaps where states have been unwilling to fill.  
UNHCR has the responsibility to ensure that the conditions in the country of origin have 
improved to guarantee the safe and dignified return of refugees and to guarantee that they 
do not feel compelled to return.   
The role UNHCR plays in repatriation programs depends upon the extent of 
involvement that the government of asylum is willing to offer.  UNHCR can actively 
promote and/or facilitate voluntary repatriation.  “A body of leges speciales constituted 
by numerous bilateral and tripartite agreements”45 between UNHCR, the country of 
origin and the country of asylum are established to control the method of refugee return.  
While these agreements emphasize the voluntary nature of repatriation and for the return 
to be conducted safely and in a dignified fashion, they are not always detailed in aspects 
specific to the given group of refugees and the transition from host to home state.  The 
safety, security and dignity of the refugee population reside in the hands of the host 
government until they are no longer in their territory.  Upon entering the country of origin 
the protection of refugees is then transferred to the home country, releasing the host 
government of any further involvement or responsibility.  While the country of origin 
must then step in, often times these states are unable or unwilling to commit to the 
reintegration of the returnees.  The increasing need for UNHCR to play a participatory 
role in these various stages of reintegration, rehabilitation and reconciliation has 
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diminished its capacity to fulfill its core mandate.
46
  Its mandate was not created for nor 
is it suitable “for engaging in the tasks which would need to be implemented to ensure the 
requisite re-establishment.”47  In other cases, UNHCR must “strike a delicate balance 
between fulfilling its protection and solutions mandate without seriously compromising 
basic protection tenets, including those which frame”48 voluntary repatriation as a durable 
solution. 
3. The Repatriation Criteria 
 
UNHCR‟s mandate outlines four conditions that must be examined before the 
consideration of repatriation:  fundamental change in circumstances, voluntary nature of 
the decision to return, tripartite agreements between the state of origin, the state of 
asylum and UNHCR, and the ability to return in safety and with dignity with unhindered 
access by UNHCR upon their return.
49
  While these are all considered to be standard 
criterion they cannot be preconditioned.  Disturbingly, the current criteria lacks a viable 
method to determine how many conditions must be fulfilled and the threshold that must 
be met in order to be considered a safe and sustainable return and thus a durable solution.  
UNHCR‟s role, with respect to seeking durable solutions 
notably voluntary repatriation, is far from a mere tangential 
one.  Apart from the fact that its mandate ratione personae 
is more encompassing than the scope rationae personae of 
the 1951 Convention, UNHCR often actually implements 
this particular solution, especially in the case of operations 
that are promoted rather than facilitated.
50
    
The current trend of normalizing voluntary repatriation by UNHCR has left some 
to believe that it is more of a political tool, dominated by mostly western states and their 
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needs, rather than a humanitarian agency.
51
  Others claim that its current role as a key 
provider of refugee protection is inadequate and palliative and that repatriation must 
reflect the refugees‟ own subjective criteria with a decision which is made at their own 
pace of comprehension and consideration.
52
  Its function as a humanitarian agency to 
ensure solutions are durable and to offer adequate protection has shifted from a focus on 
protection to the process of return, including the stages of reintegration, reconstruction 
and reconciliation.  UNHCR‟s focus of voluntary repatriation as the durable solution 
threatens the principle of non-refoulement and the right to seek asylum because it creates 
a situation where states avoid refugee situations or deter from human rights and refugee 
law obligations because of their unwillingness to host refugees for long periods of time.  
It also diminishes the demands for resettlement in third countries.  This both instills and 
confirms the “belief” that voluntary repatriation is the only viable solution, reaffirms that 
resettlement is nearly impossible and reintegration is unrealistic.  Refugees are then faced 
with the decision to return “home” or to be stuck in an eternal state of limbo. 
4. The 1951 Convention’s Ceased Circumstances 
 
The 1951 Convention‟s Article 1(C) expresses six conditions from which refugee 
status ceases.
53
  The most widely recognized of these six, as being applicable to a 
majority of refugee situations, is Article 1(C)(5):
54
 “He can no longer, because the 
circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased 
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to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his 
nationality.”55  In cases where refugee status is considered no longer applicable, the 
change in circumstances must be fundamental, stable, durable and effective.
56
    
This principle of special circumstances is further reiterated in the United Nations 
Executive Committee‟s Conclusion 69 which affirms the right of refugees to be granted 
reconsideration, on an individual basis, before the cessation clause applies to them, to 
ensure that no one continues to possess a well-founded fear before being forced to return 
home.
57
  The clause would also not necessarily apply to those who have “strong family, 
social and economic links to the state of refuge.”58  In the case of African refugees, the 
cessation clause can be invoked from either the 1951 Convention or the 1969 
Organization of African Unity‟s Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa.
59
 
In order for the cessation clause to be invoked there must be a fundamental 
political change which must be “truly effective,” durable and long-lasting, rather than 
temporary.
60
  The current system does not provide a method to measure the changes of 
state conditions in order to determine whether they are fundamental and stable.  There is 
also no way of ensuring that these changes are relative to invoking the cessation clause.  
These are all ambiguous factors in refugee law policies and areas of great concern which 
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have yet to be fully addressed.  The 1951 Convention provides little guidance on how to 
determine whether or not the risks of persecution and the foundation for well-founded 
fear have been eliminated or reduced to a level which would justify return.  
Unfortunately, the current practice of invoking the cessation clause is through the host 
state‟s objective perspective of these change in circumstances to decide if the changes 
would validate return and does not include the a subjective perspective of the affected 
refugee. 
C. Voluntary Repatriation in Practice 
 
In order to address state concerns for national security there has been a demand to 
examine the root causes of conflicts with the aim of determining the generating factors of 
refugees rather than the consequences.  This shift in focus away from possible solutions 
has added to the erosion of the durable solutions‟ foundation as the current norm is to 
promote voluntary repatriation as the only solution, under conditions which may or may 
not be voluntary.  This is also a challenge because the “insistence on voluntariness as the 
only acceptable guarantee that return does not amount to refoulement is likely to simply 
fortify the resolve” 61 of states to avoid aiding refugees in the first place.  While there is a 
need to look at refugee crises beyond just being a humanitarian issue, to include a 
political response and solution,
62
 we cannot move so far beyond it that states no longer 
adhere to human rights obligations and deter from providing refugee protection. 
Voluntary repatriation is an integral part of international refugee law, especially 
since it is considered the durable solution for refugee situations.  The nature of voluntary 
repatriation as a durable solution relies on the principle that refugees are not only able to 
return but are also able to re-establish themselves in their home country.
63
  The process of 
repatriation is divided into three distinct phases: 1) the preparation of refugees to leave 
the state of asylum to return to their country of origin, 2) the actual process of repatriation 
and the act of reception in the home state and 3) the reintegration process that occurs in 
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the home state.  All three steps are fundamental to the overall success of voluntary 
repatriation.  It is important that these phases and refugee law policies are implemented 
according to basic human rights principles and standards to maintain the effectiveness 
and durability of voluntary repatriation as a permanent solution.  The failure to do so in 
any one of the steps could result in disastrous effects as it is the refugees‟ lives at stake.  
As observed, the objective of the voluntary repatriation framework clearly extends 
beyond the assistance of UNHCR and can only be realized through the cooperation and 
cohesive efforts between the countries of origin and asylum and UNHCR.   
Since its inception UNHCR has looked for ways to ensure that refugees return 
home under durable conditions in order to prevent them from returning only to be forced 
to flee once again.  However, the failure of states to share in the “burden” that refugee 
influxes place on the countries of asylum seldom allows for refugees to return under such 
idyllic conditions.  The inability of states of the geographic South to host refugees in the 
long-term has led states to impose return on refugees in order to ease their economic, 
political and social burdens.  The unwillingness of Northern states to share this burden 
further adds to the demise of refugee protection.  Nowadays, voluntary repatriation has 
become a priority for states, not because it is regarded as the best of the durable solutions, 
but because states of asylum do not allow refugees to remain in their territory on a 
permanent basis.
64
   
In practice, the voluntary nature of repatriation scarcely exists because there are 
no other viable options but repatriation for the large majority of refugees.  When a 
refugee crisis shows no sign of abating, there is a lack of encouragement by the host state 
to integrate and resettlement is rarely offered as a realistic solution.  Refugees are left 
with no other choice but to return, and therefore repatriation fails to be an absolute 
durable solution based on an absolutely voluntary nature.
65
  In addition, the failure to 
recognize that there is no mention of “voluntariness” in the 1951 Convention, but rather 
only mentioned in UNHCR‟s Statute, only further discourages states from adhering to the 
principle of voluntary repatriation since one cannot “superimpose” this principle on an 
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international Convention.  Furthermore, one also cannot “superimpose” such a principle 
on states that may have ratified the 1951 Convention but yet have no legal obligations to 
the UNHCR Statute.
 66
 
In some instances, UNHCR may implement and facilitate repatriation programs 
“when the life or physical integrity of refugees in the country of asylum is threatened to 
the point that return is the safer option.”67  Such deterioration of conditions in the host 
country includes assault on the physical security of refugees: acts of physical attacks and 
rapes, harassment, arbitrary detainment, extortion and increasing xenophobia in the 
countries of asylum.
68
  Refugees who do not choose to repatriate “voluntarily” face 
forced deportation – refoulement- or are left to languish indefinitely in camps where they 
have to struggle to survive or live indefinitely on the assistance of handouts.  In many 
cases, because the situations are often so dangerous and the availability of protection and 
aid are inadequate, refugees have preferred returning home, regardless of whether or not 
it is safe, rather than to languish in the host state.
69
 
It is important to note that, in the African context, the 1969 OAU Convention also 
affirms the right to repatriate on a voluntary basis.  Article 5 of the Convention outlines 
five conditions to guarantee the voluntary nature of repatriation.
70
  These conditions not 
only illustrate the rights of the refugee but also the obligations of the African state to 
guarantee voluntary return.  Unfortunately, with the crises that currently plague the 
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continent consisting of primarily developing states, voluntary return is more the 
exception rather than the norm in Africa. 
1. Important Factors Often Never Considered 
 
The pressure from states to repatriate refugees causes voluntary repatriation to be 
promoted out of context, campaigned as a “social and spatial phenomenon” rather than a 
legally durable solution.
71
  In pursuance of releasing states from the burden of aiding and 
assisting large and/or protracted refugee situations, UNHCR‟s current strategy to promote 
repatriation, through the creation of idealized images of home to compel refugees to 
return, delegitimizes the voluntary nature of voluntary repatriation.
72
  In addition, many 
advocates of this durable solution have, over the years, assumed that all refugees long to 
return home and thus fail to give authority to the refugee voice.  It is important to 
consider the following points before the promotion of repatriation programs: 
1. Passage of time: Most importantly, second generation refugees do not 
want to return to a home that they do not know and of which they have no 
memories.
73
   
2. The effects of spending years in exile profoundly affects refugees that 
home is nothing more than a place of nostalgia.
74
 
3. “A gendered view of exile and return contested the „cozy image of home‟ 
projected by advocates of repatriation.”75 
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Refugees may be reluctant to return home for a variety of reasons.  Some may 
eventually, after witnessing the return of friends and family members and receiving news 
of improved conditions from returnees, be more inclined to return.  For others, the idea of 
returning home is more an impossibility than a reality due to the failure of aid 
organizations and home and asylum states to recognize and consider the psychological 
issues that one may relate to “home” as a result of past traumatic events.  There are also 
social aspects which often fail to be accounted for such as the natural tendency for 
refugees to develop ties to the community where they reside and to create a new life for 
themselves after the traumatic events that they have endured.
76
   
It is important for states to acknowledge that if refugees return on a less than 
voluntary basis there is a significant risk that they are returning to areas which are „ill-
prepared or incapable” of receiving them.77  There is also the danger that the countries of 
origin will be less than interested in their return and will thus put little effort into the 
facilitation of their re-integration.  Repatriation does not end when a refugee returns to 
the state but rather when here is successful reintegration into the home state as 
reintegration is “the anchor of repatriation.”78  Refugees may find themselves in 
conditions worse than that in which they found themselves in the host state, if their return 
is premature.  To force these individuals to return home compromises not only their 
dignity and safety but also the refugee protection system as a whole.  It is also important 
to recognize that “home” for refugees is no more than a legal fiction as the majority of 
returnees will be unable to return “home” and instead will just re-enter their country of 
origin.
79
   
2. Other Challenges 
 
Refugees are entitled to certain rights and protection as stated in the 1951 
Convention.  At the same time, however, as a human being they are also entitled to 
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specific human rights, as detailed in other documents such as the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).  The ICCPR offers asylum-seekers and refugees rights such as 
the right to self-determination and the right to pursue economic, social and cultural 
development.
80
  The UDHR affords them the right to both seek asylum and return to their 
country of origin, the right to nationality, the right to life, liberty and security of person, 
the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile and the 
right to freedom of movement.
81
  The UDHR also outlines specific rights, as would be 
applicable to returnees in their state of origin, such as the right to work, to education, 
health care, social security and other social benefits.
82
  The 1951 Convention entitles 
refugees specifically to the rights to obtain employment and access to public elementary 
education.
83
  Regrettably, many of these rights are not granted to refugees during their 
stay in the country of refuge.  Current state practice clearly demonstrates that 
“humanitarian factors do not shape the refugee policies of the dominant states in the 
international system.”84   
An additional issue of concern relates to the fact that refugees, especially those in 
protracted situations, often rely solely on humanitarian assistance.  To confine refugees to 
humanitarian assistance as the only means of survival deprives them of the opportunities 
to become educated or work in order to acquire skills, improve their situation and to 
create more self-dependency.  This deprivation of self-reliance prevents them from 
participating in income-generating opportunities, “from developing their human potential 
and limits their ability to systematically make a positive contribution to the economy and 
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society of the asylum country.”85  By maintaining refugees as passive recipients their 
lives will remain idle and in perpetual conditions of despair.  “Training and education are 
important factors in providing repatriates with realistic prospects for the future in the 
receiving country.”86  The failure of states of asylum to recognize this only aids in 
prolonging the stay of refugees in their territory.  When the situation does arise for return 
there can be both psychosocial and economical reasons for their decision to remain and 
even hesitation or skepticism.   
When repatriation programs are promoted refugees should be allowed sufficient 
time to prepare for their return.  The current trend of expedited “removal” threatens the 
integrity of repatriation programs.  The state of origin and asylum, along with the 
assistance of UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies, should offer practical assistance 
and access to resources and information.  They should be well-informed of the conditions 
of their home country and the situation that they will find themselves in upon their 
arrival.  Refugees should receive psychological treatment both prior to and after the 
return to their country of origin in order to facilitate an easier transition from living in 
exile to returning to their place of origin.   
3. The Need for Re-evaluation 
 
It is apparent that there is an urgency to re-examine the legal language and 
framework of the 1951 Convention and UNHCR‟s Statute to determine how such 
language can be interpreted.  For example, if UNHCR‟s mandate is to promote and 
facilitate repatriation when does the promotion end and facilitation begin?
87
  No 
guidelines or regulations exist to differentiate between encouragement, promotion and 
facilitation.  The lack of burden-sharing between the geographic North and South has left 
the “burden” of refugee crises largely to the Southern states to endure.  How long must 
they be willing to provide and protect refugees if they are already facing their own 
problems?  If stakeholders wish to transfer efforts in humanitarian assistance to looking 
at more preventative protection, how does this actually happen and what happens to the 
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refugee populations and their human rights?  How do global bodies act prior to the 
escalation of situations which will result in refugees and will it really make any 
difference if we can foresee such conflicts?  Again, these questions illustrate the need to 
re-examine the 1951 Convention and modify it to reflect the current situation of refugee 
problems and attempt to diminish these gaps. 
The current detriment to the principle of refugee protection is the notion that 
involuntary repatriation can occur under a variety of auspices of voluntary repatriation.  
In due time, “involuntary repatriation will become the norm” and acts such as 
“promotion, facilitation and encouragement will, despite the best intentions of UNHCR, 
be interpreted by governments to suit their narrow interests.”88  The improvement of 
home conditions should not be used as an excuse to coerce refugees to return to their 
country of origin and to the situations from which they fled in the first place.
89
  Voluntary 
repatriation cannot be considered voluntary when refugees are deprived of their basic 
rights to life and freedom through outright acts of persuasion, coercion or other forceful 
measures from the government.  These acts and measures by states often include limiting 
aid and assistance, encouraging anti-refugee sentiment and behavior from nationals as 
well as relocating refugees to unsympathetic communities or remote locations, far from 
access to services.90  The less room allowed for states to interpret refugee law to suit their 
own needs and interests the better it will be for the refugees and the refugee system, with 
a greater possibility to attain a truly sustainable and durable solution.  The UNHCR has 
already concluded that repatriation is extremely difficult to implement and that “a 
successful and relatively problem-free return is more often the exception rather than the 
rule.”91 
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A crucial factor which still needs to be considered is that substantial political 
changes do not necessarily mean that a return to the home state can be considered safe.  
Currently, however, the majority of refugees are “voluntarily” repatriating based on the 
argument that the political change is enough to advocate for return.  Are the current 
standards truly reflective of human rights norms?  For example, can repatriation occur 
when the judicial system does not meet international minimum standards thus allowing 
criminals who committed war crimes to go unpunished?  Can a country be considered 
relatively safe for return and how does one measure or determine this?  More 
importantly, is a country relatively safe enough for return when the state of refuge is no 
longer tolerant of the refugees‟ presence?92 
Most often, voluntary repatriation “operates within a highly politically-charged 
environment” which leads states to commit various pressures or acts of coercion in order 
to facilitate the refugees‟ return.93  The motivation for these pressures are often due to the 
economical, social and even sometimes political costs of hosting large refugee 
populations and/or hosting for extended periods of time.  If voluntary repatriation is to 
remain a durable solution then a normative framework for state responsibilities and 
clearer refugee law standards must be established.  The lack of burden-sharing amongst 
states and inability to offer durable solutions to protracted refugee situations has led 
many states to revert away from not only refugee law instruments but also human rights 
standards and principles.   
D. Conclusion 
 
UNHCR‟s 1997 The State of the World‟s Refugees states, “A large proportion of 
returnees have repatriated „under some form of duress‟.”94  As this chapter has revealed 
the current blurring of distinction between acts of refoulement and voluntary repatriation 
is destabilizing not only the possible durable solutions to refugee situations but also 
international refugee law.   The absence of guidelines to illustrate which acts of pressure, 
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coercion, suggestions, encouragement, persuasion and inducement are acceptable and 
unacceptable and legal and illegal as well as a legal framework for repatriation has left 
states to act according to their own free will.  The shift from UNHCR‟s non-political 
identity to one which very much maintains a political character has further allowed states 
to derogate from the 1951 Convention‟s Principle of Refoulement and taint the integrity 
of voluntary repatriation.  If states are allowed to continue on this committed path of 
implementing defensive strategies and policies “designed to avoid international legal 
responsibility toward involuntary migrants”95 then we need to look at changing the 
traditional approach of voluntary repatriation.  We must move away from the decrepit 
1950s refugee law framework to one which reflects the modern-day refugee with a focus 
on the current gaps in the refugee regime, including clear and realistic guidelines and 
protocols for voluntary repatriation with a larger focus on the needs of returning refugees.  
When acts of repatriation occur as a result of a fundamental and durable change and is 
conducted on a wholly voluntary basis then the lives of returnees may improve 
substantially however this self-determined act is rarely the norm.
96
  As observed, 
involuntary returns can actually act as a destabilizing factor which can prompt renewed 
tension and violence in the country of origin and lead returnees to flee once again.
97
   
In the era of globalization states are focusing less on the rights of individuals and 
more on the needs of national security and protection of state sovereignty.  As people 
continue to cross borders into lands in which they do not hold citizenship states become 
more preoccupied with determining ways to rid their territories of these non-nationals 
rather than offer the legal protection and assistance that may be required of them.  The 
plight of refugees “threatens the entire system that can only be resolved through the 
concerted and coordinated efforts of diverse means and agencies.”98  Thus in recent 
decades, the value of human security has diminished as national security assumes priority 
in state agendas.  The existing state perception is that its national security is a 
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precondition for the enjoyment of human security by nationals.
99
  This has narrowed the 
options and possible solutions for refugees, since refugee law has transcended its legal 
realm and has crossed into the disciplines of human rights and human security issues.
100
   
The next section will examine the state perspective of refugee law to reveal the 
central role that it plays in affording or restricting refugee protection.  It will expose how 
the state‟s objective perspective is ultimately the deciding factor for the application of the 
cessation clause.  More importantly, it will demonstrate the need to examine the effects 
that it has on voluntary character of repatriation and its current position as a durable 
solution.  It further substantiates the claim that the act of voluntary repatriation is seldom 
based on the refugee‟s independent decision. 
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III. THE VALUE OF PERSPECTIVES IN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 
 
As the previous section presented voluntary repatriation as a key component to 
the foundation of refugee law the following section will reveal how refugee law is 
contingent upon the elements of objectivity and subjectivity from the perspectives of 
states and refugees.  While many legal instruments are applied preliminarily upon the 
subjective perspective of the refugee, the complete interpretation and full application are 
based on the state‟s objective perspective, and at times even the state‟s own subjective 
perspective.  The focus on these two key elements will illustrate the refugee law system‟s 
current incoherence and disorder.  While these terms together create the framework for 
international refugee law, an in-depth examination reveals how the current system allows 
the protection of state rights to supersede the protection of refugees.  The rights of 
refugees are too ambiguously reflected in policy-making allowing states to deter from 
legal obligations of refugee protection and distort the understanding and use of central 
concepts, such as voluntary repatriation.  Beyond the disparities in the legal language, in 
its current state, voluntary repatriation cannot be considered a durable solution because of 
the sole accommodation for the state‟s objective perspective in policy-making with no 
regard for the refugee‟s subjective perspective. 
A. Which is it, Subjective or Objective? 
Refugee protection is deeply-rooted in the roles of the subjective and objective 
perspectives as they are the determining factors in the refugee status determination 
process and hence, subsequent right to protection.  The subjective perspective refers to an 
opinion, assumption or judgment while the objective refers to assumed knowledge or 
information from elements which can be seen, observed, touched and is factual.
101
  The 
objective perspective is already pre-conditioned because it suggests a pre-supposition by 
the state that because of state powers and sovereignty it is the ultimate entity of the all-
knowing.  This also proposes that the state, as an outside observer of the refugee 
experience, is cognizant of what is truth and reality better than the refugee.   
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The question that arises is how does international refugee law differentiate 
between a state‟s subjective and objective perspective?  The argument presented in this 
paper concludes that while there may be a way to distinguish between the two no 
attempts have yet been made to do such.  Rules and laws are not concrete but rather 
intangible concepts which, in determining how to apply them, require a “subjective 
process.”102  In the case of international refugee law, the subjective perspective of the 
state is treated as the objective.  States, based on their own subjective perceptions of the 
application of laws and policies, decide when and under which conditions refugee status 
is granted and terminated.  The current criterion for repatriation objectifies the state‟s 
perspective as the essential key to initiate return.  It can therefore be argued that the 
state‟s subjective perspective is weighted equally with its objective in international 
refugee law, with no need to distinguish between the two because in all cases they will be 
treated and considered as objective perspectives.  This overarching objectivity 
“disenfranchises the refugee through eliminating his or her voice in the process leading to 
the decision to deny or terminate protection.”103  The objective perspective further 
eliminates the refugee voice by “substitut[ing] the subjective perception of the State 
authorities for the experience of the refugee.”104  This discredits the refugee‟s subjective 
perspective which is dangerous as it reduces the likelihood of attaining protection.   
It is important to consider the difficulties in testing the objective perspective with 
the current framework of refugee law and guidelines for voluntary repatriation, or lack 
thereof.  While the refugee‟s subjective assessment of the necessity of protection is 
proved to be well-founded after an objective assessment of credibility and plausibility, 
there is a lack of clarity as to just how to evaluate such an assessment.  States are thus left 
with the liberty to “devise their own, and at times unduly restrictive, standards of 
assessment.”105  This freedom of decision greatly debilitates the integrity of the system 
and creates an extreme degree of injustice within the refugee regime.   
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1. The Objective and Subjective in the 1951 Convention 
 
First alluded to in the refugee definition of Article 1 in the 1951 Convention, the 
subjective perspective is based on the validity of fear that a refugee perceives to threaten 
his existence and which causes him to flee his country of origin.  While the asylum-
seeker may be able to judge his personal well-being and aspects of this fear, this alone is 
insufficient to warrant the right to protection.  In order to qualify for protection this fear 
is scrutinized by the legal framework of refugee law to evaluate and determine if an 
objective element is attached to this fear.  The current system mandates that this fear is 
only legally recognized and entitled to protection if there is a standard of proof to validate 
the claim of fear, based on the objective concept of well-founded, as further outlined in 
Article 1: hard evidence that this fear of persecution is based on one of the five objective 
grounds.
106
  While the subjective fear may be the motive to seek protection it is not the 
fear alone which grants protection if it is unaccompanied by the objective risk of 
persecution.  
The cessation clauses outlined in Article 1(C) also highlight the importance of the 
objective and subjective perspectives.  Paragraphs 1 through 4, illustrate the subjective 
perspective through the refugee‟s self-assessment of the home state and results in the 
cessation of refugee status when he voluntarily re-avails himself to the protection of his 
home state: through means of return, re-acquired nationality, acquisition of a new 
nationality or voluntary re-establishment in the home country.  Paragraphs 5 and 6, 
however, allude to the objective aspect of cessation clauses, based upon decision by the 
host state, where the refugee  
can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with 
which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to 
exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of 
the country of his nationality; (6) Being a person who has 
no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in 
connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee 
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have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his 
former habitual residence.
107
 
Articles 12 through 30 of the 1951 Convention outline numerous refugee rights 
(housing, employment, freedom of movement, for example) during the duration of their 
stay in the state of refuge.  The majority of these articles call for the Contracting Parties 
“to accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals.”108  The application 
of such rights, in all cases, is based on the state‟s subjective and objective perspective.  
While the state has the legal obligation to afford such rights, many signatory states have 
made reservations to these particular rights.  Even those states that have not made any 
reservations often create situations where refugees are unable to access such services 
easily; they subjectively perceive that refugees do not deserve access to such state 
benefits or objectively exemplify that they are unable to provide such services.  
Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention also rely on the subjectivity and 
objectivity of the state in regards to the acts of expulsion and non-refoulement.  
Contracting states are prohibited from expelling a refugee “save on grounds of national 
security of public order” and are further prohibited from acts of refoulement unless the 
refugee is perceived to be a “danger to the security of the country [or who has] been 
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime [and] constitutes a danger to 
the community of that [host] country.”109  These are based on the perspective of the state 
of refuge due to the fact that there is no shared definition of such crimes and danger 
amongst states nor are they defined in the 1951 Convention.  States are therefore left to 
their own restrictive interpretations, with the capability to validate them either 
subjectively or objectively, as to when and how such services and rights are offered to the 
refugees‟ under their protection.110   
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2. The Objective and Subjective in the African Context 
 
The 1969 OAU Convention is credited for having extended the scope of the 
refugee definition from that defined in the 1951 Convention.  The OAU Convention has 
become one of the world‟s most “flexible and innovative refugee instruments”111  Its 
expansion of the refugee clearly includes any who fit the present definition as well as 
those who,  
Owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in 
either part or the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual 
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside 
his country of origin or nationality.
112
  
Even with the expansion of the definition in an apparent attempt to “Africanize” this legal 
instrument, so as to meet the needs of the crises in Africa, the context in which it is 
written is based in the objective perspective of the state.
113
  While the first part of the 
definition, as replicated from the 1951 Convention, retains the subjective-objective 
perspective, the second part, which extends its scope, is based solely in the objective with 
its four additional causes of flight: external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, 
and events seriously disturbing public order.  The refugee‟s asylum claim is therefore not 
based on a subjective perspective to fulfill this extended definition but rather “an 
objective assessment of whether a factual situation discloses the existence of 
persecution.”114  Therefore, this broader refugee definition still relies primarily on the 
objective perspective of UNHCR and states. 
Unlike the numerous articles in the 1951 Convention, the 1969 OAU Convention 
consists of only sixteen articles, the first six of which pertain specifically to refugees and 
the relationship between states and refugees.  It does not present that rights, such as the 
right to employment or education, must be bestowed upon the refugees.  However, its 
content does include the use of vague and ambiguous language as found in the 1951 
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Convention.  While Article 1 of the 1969 Convention is considered to be the principle 
article of the Convention, due to its broadened scope of the refugee definition, it is 
important to note Article 2(4) which elucidates on the process states must take when they 
are unable to grant asylum:  
Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to 
grant asylum to refugees, such Member State may appeal 
directly to other Member States and through the OAU, and 
such other Member States shall in the spirit of African 
solidarity and international cooperation take appropriate 
measures to lighten the burden of the Member State 
granting asylum.
115
 
While the 1951 Convention does not possess such a concept, the ability for African states 
to use this article, on an objective basis, to deter from affording refugee protection only 
proves to further destabilize the overall refugee regime.   
3. Case Examples  
 
In many cases, there seems to be an apparent “objective trump”116 over the 
subjective assessment of the refugee claim.  In the case of Maria Beatriz Maldonado 
Vega,
117
 the subjectivity of her asylum claim was not questioned but rather “trumped” by 
the objective perspective based on the grounds that her “concerns were „exaggerated‟.”118  
This case demonstrates the “accepted view that subjective fear „must and can be assessed 
objectively‟.”119  Asylum cases, such those claimed in the United States by Mexican 
asylum-seekers who have crossed the border, have also faced this higher objective 
threshold.  Many claimants affected by Mexico‟s drug war have difficulties proving that 
their fear is well-founded and linked to one of the five Convention grounds.
120
  There are 
also claims which are denied because the individual did not seek asylum in a timely 
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manner thus resulting in the application of “an objective evaluation of credibility [and] 
not to the assessment of a subjective fear.”121 
Another example is illustrated in the cases of Haitians fleeing, for various reasons, 
to the U.S. by boat in the 1990s.  The U.S. Coast Guard intercepted these boats and 
forced their return to Haiti without even allowing the Haitians to seek refuge, not only in 
the U.S. but in other Caribbean islands as well.  The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that 
this forced return by the Coast Guard was not illegal
122
 and thus demonstrated the 
subjective assessment by the US government and their concerns for such persons entering 
the U.S. with the perspective that they were all economic migrants rather than asylum-
seekers.  UNHCR spoke publicly during this time affirming their concerns over such 
restrictive applications of the 1951 Convention‟s Article 33 and court judgments stating, 
“The obligation not to return refugees to persecution arises irrespective of whether 
governments are acting within or outside their borders.”123  States unfortunately continue 
to apply their own restrictive interpretations to refugee law and their policies.  “[T]he 
convention, like many international and municipal instruments, does not necessarily 
pursue its primary purpose at all costs.  The purpose of an instrument may instead be 
pursued in a limited way, reflecting the accommodation of the differing viewpoints, the 
desire for limited achievement of objectives, or the constraints imposed by limited 
resources.”124 
While these are just a few examples, they help to reveal the lower threshold that is 
placed on a state‟s subjective and objective perspective to afford full refugee protection 
compared to the higher threshold which must be met by an asylum-seeker‟s claim.  The 
subjective perspective, while necessary to begin the process of an asylum claim, is not the 
determining factor for full-fledged protection.  This approach is observed by some as 
being flawed because those who have experienced traumatic events “are often unable [to] 
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adequately…recall information [and] much less relate it in an articulate manner.”125  It is 
further flawed since, as previously mentioned, states are capable of using their own 
objective and subjective perspectives to easily negate claimants‟ fears and self-
assessment of concerns of loss of life and safety due to their ability to restrictively assess 
these cases.  The use of ambiguous language and the lack of concrete definitions only 
further allows for states to create a higher threshold in determining protection status for 
persons of concerned. 
B. The Right to Remain: Temporary vs. Permanent 
While the right to flee is based on the element of fear and lies within the rights of 
the individual, the right to cross the border and remain ultimately lies within the power of 
the state and their objective perspective.  Refugee protection is gained once these the 
subjective and objective elements are fulfilled and remain available to the refugee until 
the risk of persecution no longer exists.  The individual should then voluntarily re-avail 
himself of the protection of his home state, thus releasing the host state from any further 
responsibility.  This reiterates the notion that refugee protection is only temporary in the 
eyes of refugee law and states.  The granting of asylum by host states is “made 
conditional upon an understanding that it would not lead to a long-term presence.”126  
Once the duration of the risk of persecution ends it is presupposed that they will return 
home and the home state will assume guardianship of these individuals and provide them 
with their rights.
127
   
While there is no indication or duration of time assigned to this concept of 
temporary stay there is a clear emphasis on minimizing the time in which refugees spend 
outside of their own state and in that of the state of refuge.
128
  There are many factors 
which substantiate the inability for permanent admission.  The national legislation laws 
of many host states illustrate the inability to receive such status as the majority of 
refugees would find the requirements to acquire citizenship unattainable.  The restricted 
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rights and services offered, usually none of which reflect the rights afforded to citizens of 
the said state, solidify a state‟s unwillingness to accept refugees on a permanent basis.  
Work and educational opportunities, which would normally help to facilitate such 
possibilities, are rarely presented to refugees.  This lack of assistance exemplifies the 
impossibility of integration as a durable solution because again, refugees are considered 
guests in host states until the risk of persecution no longer exist in which case the 
“friendly” guest relationship concludes.   
There is an intrinsic link between the theory of voluntary repatriation and the 
objective element of refugee law as the refugee status definition is linked “to neither 
humanitarian need [or] respect for human rights, but rather an an individuated 
examination of fear in relation to objective conditions [so that] only truly exceptional 
claimants ought to benefit from international protection.”129  Refugee protection is 
inherently dictated by the objective perspective of the state and based on its 
characterization of protection and safety.  For example, refugees who flee from certain 
states may face a higher objective threshold, dependent upon the human rights records of 
the home state, and thus have greater difficulties in establishing the well-founded element 
of their fear.
130
  This factor alone reveals the invaluable weight placed on the objective 
perspective of that fear and the lesser importance of the individual‟s subjective fear.  This 
objectivity affirms the right to refugee protection and when the state no longer recognizes 
this element, refugees are “urged” to repatriate.    
As the “cornerstone of international protection with respect to the return of 
refugees,”131 voluntary repatriation is grounded in the notion of being a durable solution.  
Refugees are thus granted the right to make the decision to return, based on their own 
free will after being well-informed of the situation in the home state.  It can therefore be 
assumed that the idea of “voluntariness” is the necessary prerequisite for voluntary 
repatriation, based on the subjective perspective and ultimately “choice” to return, which 
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“overshadows the objective one relating to the situation in the country of origin.”132  
Unfortunately, this notion works more in theory than in actual practice as the objectivity 
of state perspectives often overshadows the subjective element of fear and concerns for 
returning home.  The concept of voluntariness is nothing more than a “moralistic” label 
given to repatriation to protect state actions and is more in name that in actual meaning. 
The real issue lies with the shifting of boundaries from voluntariness, which 
equates to an individual‟s subjective choice, to an objective element where the well-
founded fear no longer exists and thus refugees must return, whether they so desire to or 
not.  This has diverted the refugee‟s authority to make an informed decision to return to a 
decision that is led by an “institutional and state-based direction.”133  Determination 
factors for return have shifted, now based solely on objective factors, rather than a 
combination of both objective and subjective, ultimately undermining the validity of the 
voluntariness of repatriation.   
C. The Cessation Clause and Involuntary Repatriation 
The 1951 Convention‟s cessation clause allows for involuntary repatriation to 
occur under specific circumstances, normally resulting from changed circumstances in 
the country of origin.
134
  The unmistakable linkage between refugee status and the 
cessation clause “and the elimination of the factual basis for a well-founded fear of 
persecution…is simply too tight and too obvious.”135  The termination of refugee 
protection that follows “forced” return is only lawful in the realm of international refugee 
law when the conditions in the state of origin have met “a standard of human rights 
protection that would justify initial denial of protection.”136  This only asserts the need for 
                                                 
132
Vincent Chetail, Voluntary Repatriation in Public International Law: Concepts and Contents, 23 
REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 114 (2004). 
133
Katie Long, State, Nation, Citizen: Rethinking Repatriation, 21 (Refugee Studies Center, Working Paper 
Series No. 48, 2008). 
134
 However, returns are often mandated by states prior to the implementation of a cessation clause, due to 
the absence of a concrete repatriation framework and the seldom use of the cessation clause, but under the 
auspice of “voluntary” repatriation. 
135
Fitzpatrick, supra note 54 at 379. 
136
Id. at 379. 
35 
 
individuals to be screened to determine if anyone has a legitimate and compelling reason 
to unwillingly return to their country of origin.
137
 
When the cessation clause is invoked, the burden of proof needed to maintain 
refugee status affirms that the subjective element of fear has no grounds in the current 
system of refugee law.  It is this “objectivistic interpretation of the cessation 
clause…which permits the argument that it is for the state alone to decide when there has 
been a sufficient change in the circumstances in the country of origin.”138  Furthermore, 
cessation clauses in the cases of re-entrustment allow the 
authorities to deduce from his behaviour the lack of the 
subjective element of fear. By this presumption the burden 
of going forward with evidence is transferred to the asylee.  
It is up to him to produce evidence to the contrary. He 
bears the onus of demonstrating that he is objectively 
unable to benefit from protection in his country of origin 
and thus continues to be a refugee.
139
 
It is important to consider the fact that the commencement of repatriation 
programs or spontaneous return by refugees does not warrant denial of refugee status to 
new asylum-seekers.  Nor does it imply that the conditions in the country of origin have 
satisfactorily improved enough to require the application of the cessation clause.
140
  It is 
important that states continue to adhere to the legal protection standards that are afforded 
to refugees.   
As briefly discussed earlier, UNHCR has observed the need to, at times, invoke 
the cessation clause, due to the lack of alternative solutions to offer refugees other than to 
repatriate to the country of origin.
141
  The voluntary repatriation programs which are 
promoted and facilitated by UNHCR occur at times which would pertain to a lower 
threshold than that which is needed for the application of a cessation clause.  The 
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indicator of this fact is that the invocation of a cessation clause has, in practice, been 
implemented after the conclusion of a voluntary operation.
142
 
D. Is There Really a Difference? 
While voluntary repatriation is promoted as the ideal solution for concluding 
refugee protection the current blurring of distinction between involuntary and voluntary 
has led to a complete breakdown of international refugee law.  The voluntariness of 
repatriation remains a concrete international safeguard in that it frees states from 
committing acts of forced return.  It also equates to refugees wanting to go home 
although, in the instances where there is no desire to return, little attention is given to the 
refugee agency.
143
  Involuntary return is also embedded in the objective element of a 
well-founded fear of persecution because unless there is a substantiated fear and an 
unwillingness to return, refugees will in fact be forced to go back home.  The refugee 
regime, specifically states, honor the significance and authority of subjectivity when it 
“translates into the spontaneous return of the refugee [but neglect this subjectivity] when 
it involves a decision to stay.”144  As mentioned, the state‟s proponents for return 
adequately substitute the “objective change of circumstances for the refugee‟s subjective 
assessment.”145  If the meaning of involuntary is also grounded in the well-founded fear 
of persecution then in actuality the current practice of voluntary repatriation is conducted 
in ambiguous terms and at times through unethical method in which case we can no 
longer make a distinction between the two.   
Voluntary return is not truly a choice based on free will but rather mandated by 
the structure of the current refugee system.  The voluntariness of repatriation seems to be 
a humanitarian characteristic artificially imposed on the concept of repatriation so that 
returns are not considered forced and states are not accused of acts of refoulement.  As 
already stated, UNHCR can invoke the cessation clause due to a lack of viable options.  
Such actions should be considered involuntary when refugees are forced to return 
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because no other possible solutions are available.  The concept thus releases states from 
any legal repercussions for the termination of their protection and responsibility for the 
refugees.  For refugees, there is no option for refusal to voluntarily repatriate.  Whether 
one chooses to repatriate or not, a decision to remain will only result, eventually, in a 
forced return home.   
E. Who Decides Where Home Is? 
It is the primary responsibility of countries of origin to create conditions within 
their territories which are conducive to the return of their nationals, keeping in line with 
the concept of repatriation as a durable solution.  It is then primarily the host state‟s duty 
to determine when these conditions are to a certain standard that would both enable and 
justify return.   From the onset of refugee protection a relationship between the refugee‟s 
subjective and the state‟s objective perspective is created since it is the combination of 
these two elements which award refugee status.  Although, it is the host state‟s objective 
and subjective perspectives which are the determining factors in the continual assessment 
of possible termination, and underlying temporary element, of refugee status. It is when 
refugees do not wish to voluntarily repatriate that this dual-relationship between the 
subjectivity of the refugee and the objectivity of the state ends.  In situations such as 
these, the cessation of protection relies solely on the state perspectives if the conditions 
have improved and the subjective perspective of the refugee if he will re-avail himself to 
the protection of his home state by voluntarily returning home.  The facilitation of 
repatriation programs are based on these objective conditions as predetermined by host 
states and other agencies.
146
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While refugees are offered the chance to voluntarily repatriate home it is in the 
hands of the state to decide where home is as there is no legal concept of home; return 
equates to the country of origin but not necessarily the home and/or area of land from 
which they fled.  “Home is essentially a subjective phenomenon, it is not easily 
quantifiable, and consequently the value of a home to its occupiers is not readily 
susceptible to legal proof.”147  One aspect of this is explained further through the already 
mentioned concepts of temporary and permanent.  Host states deny basic rights to 
refugees which would enable their integration into local communities.  This automatically 
limits refugees from choosing host states as “home.”  The other aspect of this stems from 
the objective perspective of the state.  The state views home as the legal concept of a state 
and its citizens, with an “abstract conception of national belonging, and its overarching 
emphasis on homogenous group political identity within bounded territories.”148  States 
view this definition of home as the “key to stability and international security.”149  
Furthermore, there is an “implicit assumption [by states] of a previously existing 
relationship between [the] territorial entity, political nation and refugee-citizen”150 which 
may not have existed prior to the events which caused the individual refugee to flee. 
In most cases, refugees are unable to return to their actual home due to the 
destruction that results from civil conflict.  Many homes and villages are destroyed and 
certain areas may still be considered unstable and dangerous for returnees; for others the 
psychological trauma of truly returning “home” is too much to bear.  While states view 
home in terms of borders, rights and responsibilities, refugees perceive home as being a 
particular physical location with a community of shared traits or beliefs.  For many 
cultures there is an “inextricable link relationship between [the] homogenous group and 
the land as the basis of home.”151  Return does not necessary “return” the returnee to the 
life that he once had; it cannot be recreated to what it was prior to the events which led 
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the individual to flee.  Home often becomes a distorted memory over time and results in a 
feeling of nostalgia for home without an actual desire to return.   
What is thus missing from this negotiation of refugee/citizen exchange between 
the host state and home state is the refugee agency as a participatory actor.  Refugees are 
perceived to be incapable of processing their refugee experience and consequently unable 
to exert any power of the circumstances from which they flee, to which they find 
themselves in (in the host state) and finally to which they return.  The states, through their 
subjective and objective perspective, determine and establish the terms and conditions 
under which refugees arrive, stay and leave.  The refugee agency or voice is negated as 
the system revolves solely around the state‟s perspective and excludes the refugee‟s 
subjective perspective.   While they may seemingly be granted the right to decide 
whether to return or not there is no true decision-making process when either decision 
will ultimately result in the return to the state of origin.   
Some argue that the lack of progress with voluntary repatriation lies in the 
inability to yet provide returnees with the “basic requirements for return, that is, physical 
safety and the restoration of national protection.”152  This argument alone reflects only 
one aspect of what it means to return home.  More importantly, the current system of 
refugee law neglects the human element to voluntary repatriation.  The current solution as 
being a “mere insertion in a country”153 is in actuality secondary to the needs and desires 
of the refugees.  They do not want to just return home but they want to be home with the 
ability to be self-sufficient, no longer depending on humanitarian assistance to support 
them.   
It is the refugee‟s voice, their subjective perspective, which ultimately secures the 
renewed link between the state and refugee.  Returnees also want to feel as though they 
are a part of the political, social, economic and cultural aspects of home and to feel as 
though they are a participant in the re-building and development phases of home.  These 
factors can only be based on the refugee‟s own personal assessment and cannot be 
dictated by any state perspective or state implemented policy.  Currently, the refugee‟s 
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subjective perspective of fear is not considered to be a part of the “willingness to return” 
notion.  Many of these subjective fears are grounded in material safety of returnees, 
“which includes means of survival and basic services:”154 concerns for safety, home, 
access to health care, education and clean and safe drinking water, infrastructure and the 
capacity for self-sustainability.  Current practice shows that the offered material 
conditions are minimal to promote return and that there is a tremendous gap between 
voluntary repatriation as a durable solution and the refugee experience.
155
  Unfortunately, 
such human rights standards do not currently address many of these concerns which are 
specific to refugee circumstances.  States of refuge therefore release their responsibility 
of such securities, either in providing or ensuring that such securities are provided in the 
home state, and “encourage” their return.   
F. A Return in Safety and Dignity 
 The repatriation discourse has recently changed from the concept of voluntary 
repatriation to the consideration of the idea of “return in safety and dignity.”  Return in 
safety and dignity is an approach recommended by those in the field who have 
recognized the crisis in refugee law and the challenges in the legal framework of 
voluntary repatriation, with all of its gaps, ambiguities and misconceptions.  While it too 
provides obstacles it may illustrate the willingness to confront this crisis and attempt to 
diminish some of the current problems.   
Return in safety is the process of return which “takes place under conditions of 
legal safety, physical security and material security.”156  The notion of return in dignity is 
more ambiguous than its counterpart but refers to the idea that “refugees are not 
manhandled; [they] can return unconditionally and if they are returning spontaneously 
they can do so at their own pace; not arbitrarily separated from family members; and 
treated with respect and full acceptance by their national authorities, including the full 
restoration of their rights.”157  This approach situates the notion of safety “within a 
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paradigm of „dignified return‟ as opposed to one of external objective assessment: by 
providing refugee groups with the political space in which to shape some of the 
conditions of their return to country of origin.”  Safety is then transformed from the 
current condition as state-led objective assessment to a subjective-assessment evaluated 
by the refugee.   
While there are still gaps in this suggested approach, such as blurring the legal 
standards of voluntary repatriation, the portrayal of “untheorised concept[s] of home” and 
a failure to require substantial changes in the home before promoting repatriation,
158
 
some suggest that it offers more meaning to the concept of return than the current 
definition of voluntary repatriation.
159
  A return in safety and dignity focuses more on the 
return to local areas of origin since it eliminates the concept of political identity and 
belonging and the inextricable link of the nation-state and territorial boundaries.  The 
strategy of a dignified return allows refugees “to shape some of the conditions of their 
return to country of origin” and creates the aspect of safety as a “refugee-led subjective 
assessment” rather than state-based decision-making.160  It would allow refugees to 
decide upon the conditions and the timing of the return.  Not only would it mean a safe 
return but it would prevent forced returns.
161
   
G. Conclusion 
This discussion offers the subjective and objective perspectives as the true 
building-blocks of the entire refugee protection regime.  These concepts not only 
determine when protection is granted but also when protection concludes.  As legal 
instruments and case law have shown there has been a shift towards “objectivism in 
interpreting the definition of refugee and the cessation clause contained in the 1951 
Convention.”162  The existence of the subjective perspective in international refugee law 
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has, in most cases, become secondary to the objective element.
163
  While the current 
system functions on the basis of these two notions the examination of their role in refugee 
protection shows the instability of the system.  The ambiguities that result from their 
understanding and application only further destabilize the refugee system in view of the 
fact that other aspects of refugee law are also pre-determined by these facets. 
The legal concept of voluntariness, while a precondition to repatriation, is abstract 
and vague as the current system allows it to be “overridden by the objective conditions 
prevailing in the country of origin.”164  The discrepancy between the current legal 
definition and implementation only creates further ambiguity to its relevance in today‟s 
refugee context.  Voluntary repatriation is no longer an integral part of the system 
because its primary objective has become more of a political negotiation between the 
state and the refugee rather than an individual‟s choice.  This has led to the disintegration 
of the distinction between involuntary and voluntary repatriation.  It has assumed a role 
in practice that it was initially created to prevent; voluntariness was an added component 
to repatriation in order to prevent forced return now it only further enables it under a 
humanitarian guise.  While international refugee law may evolve around the protection of 
refugees, the underlying truth is that it was created “to protect national interests, not 
defend humanitarian principles”165 and thus could never result in the human right to 
return or to stay based on an individual‟s choice.  
The lack of empirical research on voluntary repatriation only further obscures it as 
a durable solution since it allows state assumptions to develop policies and initiate 
action.
166
  The fact that not all refugees want to go home, and those that do require a 
different set of objectives and standards to which they will return rather than those which 
have been created for them and dictate their return, further delegitimizes voluntary 
repatriation.  Refugees should be the primary actors in the contemporary practice of 
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voluntary repatriation and as a result should determine “the modalities of movement and 
the conditions reception.”167   
The following section exhibits one source of empirical research as the narratives 
provide the voice of the refugee experience from repatriated Liberian refugees.  Their 
voices substantiate the need for the standard of voluntary repatriation to rely heavily on 
the subjective perspective of the refugee.  Refugees, in maintaining the integrity of 
voluntary repatriation, should have the right to “apply their own criteria to their situation 
in exile and to conditions in their homeland and will return home if is safe and better by 
their standards.”168 The existing criteria for repatriation no longer address the needs of 
today‟s refugees, as the experiences of Liberian returnees confirm, as many choose this 
durable solution because of external pressures and, in reality, because there are no other 
viable alternatives.  While voluntary repatriation is non-binding its counterpart non-
refoulement is a legally binding-standard to which states are clearly not adhering to by 
enforcing “voluntary” returns.  These actions affect the entire legitimacy of the refugee 
law system and its sustainability.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
167
Chimni, supra note 72 at 448.  See also Hathaway and Neva, supra note 5 at 184; “With appropriate 
support, and with ready access to impartial information regarding conditions in the country of origin, 
refugees themselves will generally be the best judges as to when it is safe enough to return and when the 
home country offers reasonable prospects for economic survival. 
168
Id. at 448. 
44 
 
IV. A CASE STUDY OF FORMER LIBERIAN REFUGEES FROM GHANA 
 
“What stamps the refugee as a man apart, justifying his classifications in a specific social category, is his 
inferiority; he is inferior both to the citizens of the country which gives him shelter and all the other 
foreigners, not refugees, living in that country.” 
- Jacques Vernant169 
 
 
The previous section outlined the role that voluntary repatriation plays under the 
umbrella the objective and subjective perspective in the international refugee law regime.  
Although its role has been central to this system, a closer examination of voluntary 
repatriation in practice, based on these two perspectives, questions this centrality.  As we 
have seen, many refugee situations are no longer temporary, and unfortunately, refugees 
have become victims of the outdated 1950s legal framework.  The narratives presented in 
this chapter challenge the standard voluntary repatriation and unsettle its status as a 
durable solution for modern-day refugees; refugees who no longer fit within the scope of 
the 1950s refugee law arena.  They provide agency to the returnees as they express their 
experiences during their time of asylum in Ghana and the determining factors which led 
to the decision to return to Liberia.  Their subjective perspective demonstrates the 
importance of providing a forum to voice the concerns, questions and suggestions of the 
refugees.  
A. Methodology 
1. Purpose and Goal of Research 
 
The purpose of this research is to address the lack of accountability for 
repatriation which does not always occur under voluntary conditions.  This study 
identifies some acts of coercion that host states commit as a means to influence refugees‟ 
decision to repatriate and in effect, undermine the concept of voluntary repatriation.  
Through the identification of these acts the aim is to demonstrate the difference between 
a voluntary decision to repatriate (a decision based solely on the individual‟s choice) and 
a decision to repatriate that is a result of direct or indirect coercion.  It also aspires to shed 
light on the subjective perspective of refugees, giving an authoritative voice to such 
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disadvantages and marginalized groups which, as thoroughly discussed, are not 
acknowledged in the policy-making process.  From such research this we will have a 
greater capability to recognize the influence of a state‟s objective perspective over 
refugee situations and ways in which they commit acts of refoulement under the auspices 
of voluntary repatriation.  This research and the concluding policy recommendations seek 
to influence and demonstrate the need for a more concrete and legal framework in respect 
to voluntary repatriation and for state adherence to international refugee law and human 
rights norms. 
2. Necessity for Liberian Case Study 
 
Very little literature currently exists on the topic of the “involuntariness” of 
voluntary repatriation and what is written fails to include the refugee voice.  Furthermore, 
there has been little investigation into the types and varying degrees of coercion that 
governments use to encourage repatriation.  The majority of information is based on 
reports by UNHCR, host countries and other refugee organizations, rather than first-hand 
accounts and studies that include detailed information from individual refugee 
perspectives.  There are a few cases studies on refugees who currently reside in a camp 
and face hostilities from host governments as a means to “force” their return home but 
none on returnees and their experiences with voluntary repatriation.
170
  
This case study aims to provide the opportunity to fill the current void of 
knowledge and information in refugee law pertaining to the refugee‟s subjective 
perspective of their experiences in exile and the process of repatriation.  As previously 
discussed, in most cases only the objective element is researched and considered but it is 
essential to recognize the great importance of the subjective element of the refugee‟s 
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perspective.
171
  Each participant in this case study provides an in-depth look at the 
camp‟s atmosphere during the 2008 camp invasion by Ghanaian authorities, how 
refugees coped with the situation and a look at the decision-making process on whether to 
repatriate or not.  By assessing their subjective perspective, Ghana‟s actions and 
treatment of Liberian refugees reveals how they were directly affected by the return 
process, thereby demonstrating how Ghana‟s pressures indeed forced refugees to leave its 
territory. 
3. Importance of the Narrative Inquiry 
  
 The narrative inquiry is becoming the leading form of research methodology due 
to its emphasis on the subjective perspective and its ability to produce a rich body of 
sociological information.  Its method transcends cultures and attaches meaning and 
understanding to both individual and group experiences.  The narrative gives us a 
“cumulative, multifaceted and panoramic view” of each participant and insight into social 
and communal aspects of their life.
172
  Life histories and personal narratives, such as the 
ones documented in this paper, are invaluable tools for conducting research because 
many of their advantages cannot always be found in other forms of methodology.  They 
highlight the concerns, challenges and problems in society, provide ways to discover gaps 
in current knowledge, offer empowerment to the vulnerable and marginalized and aid in 
restoring agency.
173
  The narrative challenges current conventional research standards by 
obtaining knowledge through the identification and examination of important elements 
acquired from the individual perspective in a much larger social context.  Through direct 
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and powerful ways, the narrative not only affords an opportunity to analyze how people 
understand their stories and lives but also gives muted voices and stories, outside the 
“normal” realm of understanding, such as refugees, a forum to be heard.   
B. Liberia: A Brief History of the Lone Star State 
Many say that Liberia is another example of a failed State.
174
  Whether that is true 
or not remains to be seen as the people of Liberia move on from two civil wars and more 
than two decades of civil strife in search of their own identity.  The Republic of Liberia 
inhabits 43,000 square miles, bordering the countries of Guinea, the Ivory Coast and 
Sierra Leone.
175
  The various ethnic groups and its location in this tumultuous region of 
West Africa have hindered the success of the Liberian state.   
Founded by freed slaves from America, Liberia‟s unique history has been the root 
cause for conflict within the country.  In 1816, the American Colonization Society (ACS) 
was formed by Quakers and slaveholders from Washington, D.C.
176
  While “the Quakers 
opposed slavery, and the slaveholders opposed the freedom of Blacks” they did agree “on 
one thing: that Black Americans should be repatriated to Africa.”177  Their union 
stemmed from the Quakers‟ ideas that those freed would face better chances of absolute 
freedom and as a way to spread Christianity while the slaveholders saw the repatriation to 
Africa as a necessary preventative measure to avoid a slave rebellion.
178
  The first 
repatriation program, funded by ACS, began in 1822 with eighty-six volunteers who 
landed on present day Cape Montserrado, Liberia.
179
   
The colony was officially recognized as the Republic of Liberia and over the next 
forty years more than 19,000 African American repatriates, later known as Americo-
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Liberians, landed on the West African soil.
180
  While the number of immigrants increased 
so did the number of indigenous Africans of the land who were enslaved, creating a 
hierarchy of power, similar to that which the freed slaves had themselves fought 
against.
181
  The settlers created their own nation by recreating what they knew from 
America; homes, schools and churches were built, resembling the structures found in the 
U.S and even established English as the official language.
182
  Their attempt at “civilizing” 
the native population came through the means of intermarriage, enslavement and by 
imposing their western ideals and values.
183
  The state was declared independent in 1847 
and Joseph J. Roberts, from Virginia, became Liberia‟s first president.  President Roberts 
and his government, all American-born individuals, agreed to “create a country based on 
the principles of justice and equal rights.”184  However, this agreement never fully took 
fruit while “Liberia expanded its borders, [the] government of repatriates located largely 
on the coast attempted to establish control over a growing native population located 
largely in the interior.”185    
Despite its political, economic, and social troubles, Liberia became the model 
state for those African colonies struggling to gain independence; it was a founding 
member of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.
186
  Unfortunately, 
the gap between the ruling elite and the indigenous populations only increased as time 
passed.  The majority of Liberians were poor and lacked basic amenities such as safe 
water and electricity. During the presidency of William R. Tolbert, Jr., from 1971-1980, 
an attempt to liberalize Liberian society and his 1979 proposal to increase the price of 
imported rice - a staple food in Liberia - in order to encourage local rice production, only 
provided the match for the fire that had been brewing within the country.
187
  People 
gathered to protest against the government and its policies but the demonstrations quickly 
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grew out of control and turned violent.  From that point on the situation in Liberia only 
deteriorated. 
On 12 April 1980, Samuel Doe, from the Kahn tribe and a Master Sergeant in the 
Liberian army, staged a military coup against President Tolbert and the ruling Americo-
Liberian elite.
188
  The coup marked the beginning of more than two decades of internal 
conflict.  In 1989, Charles Taylor aided in overthrowing President Doe and later became 
President of Liberia in August 1997, ending the first civil war.
189
  The second civil war 
began soon after Taylor‟s election as President, due to rebel factions wishing to 
overthrow his regime, and lasted until 2003.  The fourteen years of conflict left more than 
200,000 Liberians dead, created 250,000 refugees and displaced more than 350,000.
190
 
C. Buduburam Refugee Camp in Context 
In 1990, UNHCR established the Buduburam Refugee Camp, outside of Accra, 
Ghana, to accommodate the influx of Liberian refugees fleeing Liberia after the coup 
which ousted Doe.  While primarily a haven of refuge for Liberians, the camp also hosted 
a number of refugees from Sierra Leone, Cote d‟Ivoire, Togo and various other African 
nationalities.  At the height of the civil conflicts in West Africa, the camp maintained a 
population of more than 40,000 refugees and asylum-seekers.  UNHCR initially pulled 
out of the camp in 2007 after the declaration of a cease-fire but soon returned after 
Charles Taylor‟s instatement as President of Liberia and the quick deterioration in the 
country once again.  In 2003, the camp was changed to Buduburam Settlement due to the 
“improved infrastructure coupled with the fact that it [had] been in existence since 
1990.”191 
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In 2003, Charles Taylor resigned as Liberia‟s president and a peace agreement 
was signed by all the warring factions.
192
  On 22 September 2004, the governments of 
Ghana and Liberia with UNHCR signed the first tripartite agreement.  This agreement 
outlined the legal framework for the repatriation of Liberian refugees; free choice to 
repatriate, the modalities of the repatriation process, etc.  This was the third time that 
UNHCR had organized a repatriation campaign, after conducting earlier operations in 
1991 and 1997.
193
  This third round of repatriation began in October 2004 and ended on 
30 June 2007.  The agreement aimed to repatriate 14,000 Liberian refugees but due to 
various factors including security concerns, a lack of infrastructure and economic 
instability in Liberia,
194
 only 4,000 voluntarily returned.
195
  Hesitations to return also 
stemmed from those refugees who returned after earlier cease-fires only to have to flee 
again due to the resumption of violence.  As of 31 December 2007, an official residual 
caseload of 75,509 Liberian refugees remained in neighboring West African countries, 
specifically Ghana, Cote d‟Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea.196  
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1. Prospects of Integration in Ghana 
 
Ghana visibly opened its doors in the early 1990s to accommodate the large influx 
of refugees fleeing the plague of crises that consumed many neighboring West African 
countries.  The large reception of refugees at the time proved challenging to the 
politically stable state as it had no legislation or policies pertaining to refugees in place at 
the time.   It was not until 1992 that the state established the Ghana Refugee Board with a 
mandate to oversee Ghana‟s refugee populations.  The Ghana Refugee Board maintained 
“that the government is committed to the integration of refugees locally,” however no 
precise policy prescriptions were provided to substantiate its commitment.
197
   
Liberian refugees had the option to either voluntarily repatriate or integrate into 
the local host community as possible solutions to their situation.  Integration is defined as 
“the ability to participate fully in economic, socio-cultural and political spheres in the 
host country without relinquishing one‟s ethno-cultural identity and culture.”198   
Refugees must be afforded the opportunity to adapt to their host society, through 
integration programs, without being required to relinquish their own cultural identity.  
The three possible forms for integration in Ghana were: 
 Naturalization through the Ghana Immigration sector 
 Citizenship gained by marriage to a Ghanaian national 
 Acquisition of residence permits or extended stay as a member of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
199
 
While these three options are legally possible for refugees, in practice, the process 
of acquiring citizenship is evidently much more challenging.  Intermarriage is not 
common and one requirement of the naturalization process is the ability to speak at least 
one of the Ghanaian national languages.  Liberians did not have the opportunity to learn 
one of the Ghanaian dialects as they existed within their own Liberian community and 
only communicated with Ghanaians when necessary, like in the market, for example.   
Since the creation of the Ghana Refugee Board there has been no clear evidence 
of the state‟s willingness to offer integration into Ghanaian society as a prospective 
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solution for refugees.  Section 14 of the Ghana Refugee Law (PNDC Law 305D) also 
outlines the viability for refugees to become naturalized.
200
  While this law is in place 
there are no clearly defined implementation policies or approaches to realize such 
naturalization rights.  One poster, observed in a refugee camp in Ghana, concerning 
integration offered fairly ambiguous details regarding rights of refugees who decided to 
integrate.
201
  Concerns of security issues and the burden of providing resources for these 
individuals have both been mentioned as reasons for the lack of the promotion of 
integration.
202
  Public statements by government officials have also clearly shown 
Ghana‟s lack of support of integration as a durable solution.  In 2008, in response to 
demonstrating Liberian refugees, the then-Minister of Interior publicly stated, “[L]et me 
once again reiterate that Government has not decided to integrate them [refugees] nor 
does it have any intention to do so.”203   
The strained relations between refugees and the host state only increased the 
hostility between the two entities.  The common perception that refugees and nationals 
are in competition for resources and aid only further validates claims that integration is 
not a possible solution.  With resettlement packages no longer a possibility,
204
 
repatriation remained as the only possible solution.      
2. Liberian Women Protest for Improved Repatriation Packages 
 
On 19 February 2008, hundreds of Liberian women organized a sit-in to display 
their dissatisfaction with the repatriation package offered by UNHCR and the Ghana 
Refugee Board.  The repatriation package allotted US$5 to every refugee who returned 
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under UNHCR‟s repatriation program and free return to Liberia.  The women submitted a 
petition to the two agencies, outlining their requests: resettlement in a third country or an 
increase from US$5 to US$1000.  The women aimed to conduct a peaceful protest, with 
only female participants so as not to give the Ghanaian government “an excuse to employ 
violent measures against the protesters.”205   The women held banners and signs which 
read “Integration? NO! Repatriation plus $1000? YES! YES!”, “Geneva Help US”, and 
“Ghana Refugee Board, STOP THE OPPRESSION.”206  These peaceful and non-violent 
actions called not only for a better repatriation package but also an end to intimidation by 
Ghanaian authorities.  There were rumors spreading around the camp at the time that 
UNHCR was offering the Ghanaian government US$1500 for every Liberian refugee that 
integrated into Ghanaian society.  The women advocated for better use of this money by 
using it for refugees to return to Liberia and help to rebuild their lives, in a country not 
only plagued by civil strife for more than fourteen years but one which many had left 
more than a decade ago.  
Days after the protests began, the Ghanaian media reported many unfounded 
facts: Liberian women were undressing and protesting naked, naked women were running 
around the streets and stopping traffic and refugees had attacked a UNHCR and Ghana 
Refugee Board delegation to the camp.  These statements only enhanced the animosity of 
the Ghanaian nationals towards the refugees.  In an effort to deter the Liberian women 
from protesting further and to calm the rising tensions, UNHCR increased the repatriation 
monetary offer from $5 per person to $100 per adult and $50 per child.  At the time, “the 
secretary to the [Ghana Refugee] board, Abdulai Bawumia, told IRIN news network that 
integrating Liberian refugees into Ghanaian society [was] out of the question.”207 
The protest continued for weeks before the Ghanaian government deemed the 
actions a “contravention of the Public Order Act (Act 491).208  On 17 March 2008, they 
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subsequently arrested over six hundred of the peacefully protesting women, including 
elderly women, lactating mothers, and even small children who were with their mothers 
at the time.  The government detained the women for weeks in a remote location.   
UNHCR quickly demanded access to these women but while their request was still 
pending, in the early morning hours of 22 March, Ghanaian security officials entered the 
camp and arrested 107 individuals, the majority of whom were males.  They eventually 
released seventy-seven of these individuals while fourteen remained in detention facilities 
and sixteen were forcefully expelled to Liberia; UNHCR recognized thirteen of these 
deported individuals as refugees.
209
  The security officials claimed to have entered the 
camp in order “to arrest a number of identified ringleaders of the demonstrations and 
some of the people who posed a threat to the security of the State.” 210 UNHCR urged 
Ghanaian officials to “cease any further forcible removal”211 of Liberian refugees, 
however in early April, the government deported twenty-three more Liberians.  Legal aid 
organizations had previously challenged this round of deportation but to no avail.
212
  At 
the time, UNHCR did successfully secure the release of ninety of the detained women, 
including pregnant women and unaccompanied children.  The remaining detained women 
were all released at a later date.  
These events left the refugee camp, with a population around 40,000 at the time, 
in a state of fear and chaos.  The ensuing turmoil of widespread fear and panic amongst 
the camp‟s inhabitants resulted in a mass influx of registration for UNHCR-administered 
repatriation program to Liberia.  Liberia‟s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf sent a 
government delegation to Ghana in order to find an amicable solution to the 
demonstrations and release of those detained.  The delegation did express their concerns 
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over the negative impact that the large returnee population would have on the recovering 
Liberian economy.
213
  A new tripartite agreement was signed between the governments 
of Liberia and Ghana and UNHCR.
214
  Repatriation operations resumed, less than a 
month later, on 13 April with adults and children receiving US$100USD and US$50 
respectively.  Between April 2008 and April 2009, 9,703 recognized Liberian refugees 
repatriated
215
 through UNHCR‟s repatriation program; more than one-third of the camp‟s 
recognized Liberian refugee population.
216
  More than 7,000 of these returnees returned 
to Liberia within the first five months of the repatriation program.
217
  Less than a year 
later the population of the camp was thought to be around 10,000.   
As the Liberians left, their empty homes were quickly filled with Ghanaian 
citizens.  Given the lack of development in Liberia, many Liberians had hoped to attain 
some sort of training skills or higher educational opportunities during their time in 
Ghana; they wanted to be able to return to Liberia where they could live off of their own 
means, no longer having to rely on humanitarian assistance.  Even UNHCR‟s established 
programs in Liberia, to aid in the facilitation of reintegration, had concluded.  They 
previously offered skills-training programs (tailoring, computer literacy, baking, 
hairdressing, etc.), created shelters for vulnerable returnees and IDPs and offered micro-
loan and grant scheme program.  However, these services ended as the UNHCR began 
phasing out of its country operations in Liberia.
218
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3. Ghana Invokes the Cessation Clause 
 
On 20 March 2008, the Ghanaian government invoked the 1951 Convention‟s 
cessation clause, signaling the end of protection assistance for the Liberian refugees 
remaining in Ghana.  Ghana‟s Minister of Interior stated that the refusal of Liberian 
refugees to integrate into the Ghanaian society, after having spent so many years in the 
country, was “very insulting”219 and that the detained protesting women would be 
“stripped of their refugee status and forcibly deported to Liberia by the end of the 
week.”220  He further illustrated his discontent with the refugees‟ “unruly behaviour” and 
commented that such behavior created “an anarchic state at the Buduburam settlement” 
and led to “grave security implications for the country.”221  The Ghanaian government 
therefore thought it was appropriate to enter the camp – on two separate occasions – to 
arrest hundreds of innocent and peacefully protesting women and men playing basketball. 
Ghana invoked the cessation clause only after authorities invaded Buduburam on 
17 March and arrested the protesting women and just two days before their invasion of 
the camp and deportation of Liberian males.
222
  While UNHCR did “hope” that the 
government would change their stance on the Liberian situation at Buduburam, there 
seemed to be a real breakdown of communication and attempts to facilitate more peaceful 
arrangements by all stakeholders did not prove successful.  This lack of communication 
was mainly observable in the media‟s portrayal of the situation and speeches made by 
head Ghanaian government officials.  Even refugees within the camp began to divide, as 
those involved in the discussions with UNHCR and the Ghana Refugee Board were 
thought, by many, to be acting out of their own self-interests rather than for all refugees 
of the camp.  
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Such invocation of the cessation clause, as previously discussed, allows for 
individuals to undergo reconsideration, on an individual basis, before the cessation clause 
applies to them.  This reaffirms the right to refugee protection by guaranteeing that no 
one is at risk of persecution before being forced to return home.
223
   The failure to adhere 
to such policies and treatment of refugees is a breach of international refugee law.  Acts 
such as this must be condemned by the international community if we are to ensure the 
protection of refugees and if refugee law is to be taken seriously by states as true legal 
obligations. 
After some external pressures the Ghanaian government finally halted the 
deportations in order to “draw up a roadmap to repatriate the 40,000 Liberian 
refugees.”224  A UNHCR Global Agenda Update on Ghana reported, “In 2009 the 
Government may seek to close Buduburam camp and remove the remaining refugees into 
Ghanaian communities.”225  However, more recently, UNHCR, and the governments of 
Liberia and Ghana re-examined the concerns for the fate of those Liberian refugees who 
have continued to remain in Ghana.  The cessation clause, outlined in this agreement, 
indicated that if the electoral process, planned to take place in October 2011, is 
“successful and peaceful according to international standards” and that a democratic 
president and legislative members satisfy the international community then Liberia will 
be “declared safe and peaceful.”226  Then “Liberian refugees in Ghana will be left with no 
other option rather to opt for repatriation, local integration and left to fight there [sic] own 
cause.”227  Regardless of positive political developments in Liberia, Ghana needs to 
reaffirm its legal obligations in light of the necessary safeguards in cases of all refugee 
nationalities.  
4. The Condition of Liberia in 2008 
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In 2008, at the time of the Ghanaian government‟s invasion of Buduburam camp, the 
situation in Liberia could be considered dire.
228
  The unemployment rate was at 85% and 
80% of population lived below the poverty line.
229
  The life expectancy at birth was at 
41.12, down from 51.8 in 2002.
 230
 A lack of development five years after the end of the 
civil war resulted in only 10.6 Km of paved roadways with no electricity and access to 
clean and safe running water.
231
  An increase in food prices led to an increase in food 
insecurity in Monrovia, from 4% up to 8% in just a year and a half.
232
  It is estimated that 
another 40,000 households, or about a quarter of a million people across Monrovia, have 
reduced the quality and frequency of their food intake over the past year and a half.
233
  
Liberia had an external debt of $3 billion USD and UNMIL had, and continues to 
maintain, a presence with 15,000 UN peacekeepers in the country.
234
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Clearly inadequate attention has been given to both the security of home countries 
and the voluntary nature of repatriation by both international aid agencies and policy-
makers in the realm of refugee law.  Some argue that beyond the basic criteria, as 
outlined by UNHCR, there must be a close examination of social issues: access to health 
care, education, as well as any possible barriers to self-sufficiency.  It is evident that the 
current conditions for the implementation of voluntary repatriation programs fail to 
examine any of these issues or any of the outlined challenges faced in Liberia in 2008.  
Furthermore, as previously mentioned the cessation clause should not necessarily apply 
to those who have “strong family, social and economic links to the state of refuge.”235  In 
many cases, this would prove applicable to the Liberian refugees in Ghana since a large 
portion of the Buduburam population had resided there for more than a decade. 
It is evident that states do not consider which conditions are suitable for the 
individual refugees but rather which conditions create a “good enough” situation for them 
to relinquish further protection.  It is reasonable to declare, as will be illustrated in the 
narratives below, that this objective criterion fails to consider what the individual refugee 
deems as essential or important for returning “home,” the subjective perspective of the 
refugee.  Other factors may be considered important but not vital and thus will not appeal 
to a refugee since the home environment is not one which contains the elements to which 
they will want to return.  In a camp, they have created a home where many of the issues 
in their home country are not necessarily problems in the camp, or perhaps not to such a 
degree.  While there may be an urge to return home, as the following narratives will 
illustrate, the reluctance to voluntarily repatriate stems from various political and social 
problems as well as a lack of development and basic services available.  These 
deficiencies do not enable the individual refugee to return home with the necessities for 
re-establishment.   
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D. The Voices of Former Liberian Refugees 
In the refugee context, the term emplacement refers to the transformation of “an 
unfamiliar physical space into a personalized, socialized place” with the formation of a 
community “through creative action and structural transformation.”236  This is exactly 
what Liberian refugees achieved in Buduburam as they transformed an empty field into 
their own Liberia.  From the preliminary materials they received from UNHCR (tents, 
sticks, blankets, etc.) they took it upon themselves to gather money to buy the materials 
to create homes out of mud walls and tin roofs.  Along with the help of aid organizations 
and community-based organizations (CBOs) within the camp they began to recreate 
“home” by building schools, movie houses, shops, restaurants, barbershops and even a 
few bars.  While permanent settlement was not their objective, the idea of not knowing 
how long they would be displaced created the need for an existence of a community feel; 
a way to move on from the traumatic experiences from which they had fled.  
The concept of voluntary repatriation is grounded in the idea that it is the desire of 
the individual to go home.  In the case of Liberian refugees in Ghana, after a series of 
events took place in March 2008, they truly felt as though they had no other choice.  
Having spent years in Ghana, Liberian refugees seemed to be waiting for their time, 
either to return home or travel to a third country.  Ultimately, they were waiting for their 
time to finally experience living.  Suddenly, this indefinite time was determined for them; 
the Ghanaian government‟s refusal to host the refugee population any longer created a 
state of fear amongst the refugees.  Their fate had been decided without consulting them 
but ultimately, many opted to return to their homeland rather than face further abuse or 
even death in Ghana.  The following narratives will provide an insight into the life of a 
Liberian refugee living in Buduburam, Ghana to illustrate the challenges they faced and 
their experiences there. 
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 1. Common Everyday Harassment 
 
Harassment by locals is common for refugees as there is often an “us vs. them” 
dynamic caused by misunderstandings and misperceptions of the reasons why refugees 
are in the locals‟ own country.  For some it originates from the uneasiness of having large 
numbers, often in the thousands, of outsiders suddenly in one‟s community while for 
others it derives from jealousy and anger because international aid and attention is given 
to the specific group of “outsiders.”  Harassment and discrimination are also common 
from immigration and police officials as they are able to use their authoritative power to 
permit and deny entry and regulate movement in the state of asylum.  They often abuse 
this authority by demanding bribes and at times commit physical and sexual abuse.
237
 
There was no shortage of complaints from the eleven participants who 
volunteered to describe their experiences living in Buduburam.  Their Liberian 
nationality and status as refugees in the country only added to the misconceptions and 
negative attitudes from the host communities, who believed that aid was going to 
Liberians when it should have been going to Ghanaians.  Their inability to communicate 
with the Ghanaians in their local dialect did not ease in their assimilation and left the 
majority of refugees vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.  Liberian refugees were often 
used as scapegoats for many of the challenges and problems in Ghana; “Everything that 
happens, whether that happens in a different place, they will say that Liberians do it.”238 
Ghanaians often accused Liberians of being rebels and of assisting in the civil war in 
Cote d‟Ivoire.  A large portion of the harassment took place in the Ghanaian market areas 
or on public transportation.  One participant described his experience in the tro-tro – 
common transportation in Ghana – and how Ghanaians in the bus screamed insults at him 
about Charles Taylor and how all Liberians are rebels.  Another participant described 
how she would always have to observe sellers and buyers in the marketplace so that she 
would not be charged more than the normal prices just because she was Liberian.   
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The majority of participants displayed frustration with UNHCR, composed of 
Ghanaian nationals, and other aid organizations and their lack of interest in understanding 
the cultural dynamics of Liberians.
239
  As earlier noted in the portion on Liberia‟s history, 
rice is the staple part of a Liberian diet – not corn.  Those refugees in Buduburam, 
identified as vulnerable individuals, received food rations which included maize; some 
Liberians perceived it to be “comparable to animal feed.”240  The individuals would 
quickly turn around and sell it to the Ghanaian traders from Accra who “descend[ed] on 
the camp only to buy maize grain directly from the beneficiaries.”241  These traders 
would then sell it in the Ghanaian markets making a substantial profit while the Liberians 
would use their meager earnings to buy rice.  So why was rice not distributed to them in 
the first place, especially since aid organizations knew about this trading of maize for rice 
system?  This is one example of the lack of awareness, care and interest that the Liberians 
found to be very discouraging.  Such inattentiveness left Liberians with the impression 
that, from the very beginning of their time in Ghana, the Ghanaian government and host 
communities were not interested in helping Liberians.  This perception led to even further 
resentment and animosity between the refugees and the host state. 
2. Access to Education 
  
As in most countries, education is thought to be the framework which shapes an 
individual‟s future.  Such a belief is shared in West Africa, and was observable in 
Buduburam.  Many refugee schools were established to provide educational opportunities 
for children.  There were also training centers, such as baking and sewing schools, to 
provide certain skills.  The primary educational challenges became noticeable once an 
individual completed high school or for those adults who had limited or no education.  
The only possibility for higher education was to attend one of the Ghanaian universities 
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but such opportunities had to be self-financed as no scholarships were offered to refugees 
and humanitarian agencies did not provide assistance for such endeavors.  Another source 
of frustration stemmed from the lack of work opportunities, especially for those with 
higher degrees or those who obtained degrees in Ghana.  These lack of opportunities 
proved to be detrimental to the self-sufficiency of the Liberians and became a source of 
further detest for their situation in Ghana. 
Almost all participants complained about the higher educational fees required of 
them, compared to that of Ghanaian nationals, to attend Ghanaian schools.  Many did 
what they could in order to attend these schools because of the higher quality of 
education compared to the schools established in the camp.  Some resorted to selling 
water or baked goods while others relied on the generosity of resettled family members 
and friends to send them money to pay the school fees.   
One young female participant described her experiences attending a Ghanaian 
boarding school: 
To stay at the boarding house the discrimination was too 
much.  For me, I couldn‟t come from home and leave my 
house every day.  So I stayed on the campus but it was 
tedious because they call you a lot of names.  Sometimes 
they call you Liberian 4
242
 or sometimes they call you 
Ashawo which is prostitute [in local Ghanaian dialect].  
Sometimes they tell you that you are rebels, that you are 
killers and that they can‟t trust you.  Sometimes they spit 
on your food.  Sometimes you go to the bathroom to take a 
bath but no one else will enter because you are a 
Liberian.
243
 
After completing high school, this participant was fortunately able to afford the 
costs of attending a skills-training program.  However, even in this program she 
experienced harassment and other setbacks.  For example, the books required for such 
courses were at a higher cost for her than her Ghanaian colleagues.  Even after acquiring 
these additional skills she was unable to obtain a job.  “Also, you can‟t get a job in 
Ghana.  I went and applied to so many places but when they see your nationality -you‟re 
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a Liberian- they don‟t even consider it.  Even if you‟re qualified or even more qualified 
they won‟t give it to you because you‟re a Liberian.”244 
Another female participant described similar discrimination and harassment while 
attending school in Ghana.  She described situations in which the school offered 
additional support and classes to Ghanaian students but not to her.  There were incidences 
where her teacher told her that on certain days there would be no classes when classes 
were actually held.
245
  She also reaffirmed the previous participants‟ inability to secure a 
job based on her Liberian nationality.  “They will prefer giving their citizens the job.  If 
you send in maybe your CV and they send in theirs, whether you are qualified or not they 
will not give you the job.”246  Due to their inability to secure employment opportunities 
or substantial ways to earn a living many resorted to other ways of creating income-
generating support: selling bags of water, washing clothes or braiding hair in order to 
survive.  All complained of the need to constantly struggle in order to live and to provide 
for their family and friends; refugees in the camp often had to rely on one another for 
“small small” money here or food there.    
3. Issues with Resettlement 
  
Refugees often face trust issues due to traumatic experiences from events which 
led to their departure from their home country, the transit period and while in the host 
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country.  These trust issues can affect relationships with others within the camp as well as 
with outsiders, such as locals, government officials and aid agencies.  In the case of 
Liberian refugees in Ghana, many events created an environment of mistrust between the 
refugees and UNHCR, primarily because of UNHCR‟s close relationship with the Ghana 
Refugee Board and because UNHCR Ghana‟s employees are primarily Ghanaian 
nationals.     
Four of the participants relayed stories of Ghanaians traveling to the United 
States, on the US resettlement program, but under Liberian names and passports.  One 
male participant described how his friends found their names on the resettlement board 
located at the top of the camp.  However, when they went to the airport to leave, names 
were called but they saw other groups boarding planes – groups of Ghanaians – going in 
place of them.
247
  Another participant reaffirmed this by stating, “Many days our parents 
when they send for us, they go to the airport to receive us and they find another 
family.”248  Stories such as these only further “authenticated” the refugees‟ grounds for 
distrusting the overseeing refugee agencies.  They often felt alone and helpless, forgotten 
by the rest of the world, as even those who were supposed to be there to help them did 
not.    
4. Safety Concerns in Buduburam 
  
Safety can be ambiguous in that it can be composed of various elements 
depending on the individual and the culture from which he or she originates.  For 
refugees, varying degrees of assistance can amount to security but refugee law‟s general 
definition of security is principally established as the right to life, liberty and security of 
person.
249
  One thing that is for certain is that the camp atmosphere should be one which 
exhibits all aspects of personal security.  Refugees have fled from unsafe conditions and 
find refuge in host countries and camps to re-gain this protection and a sense of security.  
Refugee camps, however, are often plagued with insecurities: crime, assaults, armed 
robberies, rape, and kidnappings, issues with former rebel or government soldiers and 
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even encounters with former torturers or abusers.  Buduburam Refugee Camp was no 
different and the majority of refugees faced numerous security issues at one time or 
another.    
The majority of participants relayed one story or another about the security issues 
within the camp.  “Joe the Juker”, a Ghanaian man, would walk around the camp late at 
night and juke
250
 the refugees in their homes with a long spear.  After this occurred on 
many separate occasions a group of Liberians were successful in catching him.  They 
quickly brought him to the Ghanaian police station at the camp‟s entrance and handed 
him over to the authorities.  However, like many other incidents involving Ghanaian 
nationals, Joe the Juker was released without any further investigations.  
In order to address the security concerns of the camp, the Liberian refugees felt it 
necessary to “take justice into their own hands” by forming a neighborhood watch 
committee.
251
  There were many documented events which resulted in the death or 
serious harm of a Liberian and the Ghanaian involved would always be released.  “As 
soon as one of the Ghanaians speak Twi
252
 they free them.”253  Ghanaian police arrested 
one Liberian male participant for participating in a fight between him and a Ghanaian 
male even though the authorities had been told, by numerous witnesses, that he had not 
been involved in the altercation.  The police slapped him and placed him in jail.  He had 
to rely on funds raised by his mother‟s church to retain a lawyer to help appeal his case 
and gain release from jail.  
The need for Liberians to take action in order to bring some degree of security 
and justice to the camp also validates the refugees‟ negative perception of the Ghanaian 
government and aid organizations and the necessity to fend for themselves.  After a 
while, they found it futile to even attempt to report any crimes to the Ghanaian police 
who held an office at the camp‟s entrance.  Frequent raids and the unwillingness to 
prosecute Ghanaian citizens for crimes involving Liberians exhibit the lack of support 
and protection on behalf of the host state.  Refugees are extremely vulnerable as they are 
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outside of their own country, having fled from violence and often traumatic events, and 
are entitled to protection from further insecurities and traumatization.  Host states, such 
as Ghana, often commit these acts of harassment and intimidation in order to unsettle 
refugees, to remind them that they are guests and that their stay is only temporary.      
5. The 2002 Camp Invasion 
 
 The seven male participants all related their encounter with the Ghanaian army‟s 
visit to the camp in early 2002.  According to their accounts, the whole camp was 
sleeping when, over the loud-speakers, they heard the demand for all male refugees 
within the camp to report to the football field, near the entrance of the camp.  While the 
army surrounded the entire field, the camp‟s male refugees were compelled to wait for 
hours, under the hot sun, as they listened to insult after insult from the Ghanaian Interior 
Minister Kwamena Bartels.  His presence at the camp came soon after the outbreak of 
fighting in neighboring Cote d‟Ivoire as the Ghanaian government was suspicious that 
Liberian men were crossing the border, into Cote d‟Ivoire, to aid the rebel movement.  
Minister Bartels accused the Liberian women of being prostitutes, the men as rebels and 
of engaging in armed robberies and the trafficking of drugs.
254
  On this occasion, the 
army beat some men and arrested and detained others.  Dogs and guns were used to scare 
the 11,000 or so men on the field.  In the end, the men spent a total of around ten hours 
on the field, without food or water, before being able allowed to return to their homes.   
6. The 2008 Camp Invasion   
 
The $5 USD repatriation offer to Liberian refugees was insufficient as it would 
not have provided them the means of securing a home, or food or any necessities upon 
their arrival in Liberia.  The women‟s decision to protest was not to defy or embarrass the 
Ghanaian government, but to appeal to UNHCR for more financial support; they wanted 
aid that reflected the economic situation in Liberia thus enabling a return with the ability 
to re-establish themselves and be self-sustainable in the long-term.  The threats and 
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“fallacious and fabricated lies”255 by the Ghanaian media marked just the beginning of 
the unraveling relations between the refugees and the host state.  The ensuing physical 
and emotional abuse, detainment and deportations both shocked and created fear 
throughout the refugee community.  For many, it was described as a period of re-
traumatization with the armed security forces entering the camp and treating the refugees 
as they pleased.  As one participant stated, 
I‟ll tell you one thing, some of our colleagues were sent 
back to Liberia in boxers.  We were living in complete fear 
at that time.  Some of us were not sleeping at our own place 
because we thought where we sleep our houses will be 
surrounded and we will be deported or taken to unknown 
locations.
256
 
One female participant was one of the 600 women arrested and was detained in 
the remote village of Kordiabe for more than a month after actively protesting.  Her 
detailed narrative addressed her experiences over the course of the month and the 
conditions that she was forced to endure.  During the time of her arrest, the Ghanaian 
authorities physically abused, repeatedly kicked and hit, the women as they forced them 
onto one of numerous army trucks that entered the camp on 17 March.  In remote 
Kordiabe, scorpions and snakes are prominent which resulted in many illnesses and 
necessary medical treatments for ailments caused by snakebites and scorpion stings.  At 
one point the Ghanaian authorities dug holes around the women and threatened that “with 
those holes they would just massacre us [the refugee women] and put us there.”257  
Armed men kept a close watch on the women, treating the women like prisoners and 
escorting them everywhere, even to use the bathroom.  It was not until the delegation 
from Liberia arrived that these women were allowed to speak to anyone from “the 
outside” as many other human rights organizations had been denied access to the women. 
But looking at what started to transpire, I mean we were 
living in complete fear.  Life started to be tedious to us 
because we can‟t be in another man‟s country, being 
insulted and threatened with armed men surrounding the 
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camp.  Right?  Armed men don‟t enter a refugee camp but 
it happened in Ghana.
258
 
 One of the male participants arrested on 22 March, while playing basketball on 
the court near the camp‟s entrance, was accused of being a rebel and of attempting to 
overthrow the Ghanaian government.  The security forces placed him in a Moah -a type 
of tank- with other Liberians before being brought to a detention facility in the capital of 
Accra.  During the hours in which he was detained and questioned he was repeatedly 
insulted and physically abused with a batu (a baton).  He stated that those who did not 
have their UNHCR ID cards with them at the time were taken straight to the airport to go 
through deportation proceedings; he, fortunately, had his ID with him at the time.   
7. The Process Home to Liberia 
 
But you cannot come home when you have kids and you 
come home and you live under your friend or you stop with 
someone and it will be for a week.  When it gets to a month 
or two it gets to be boring.  So some people had family 
members that were waiting to accept them but the majority 
didn‟t have, didn‟t have nowhere to go.  Some left the rural 
area in 1990.  They don‟t even know the hut that they left 
and whether it still exists.  Some left from Monrovia in 
1990 or 1995 or so.  The house that they left burnt to ashes.  
The family or the majority [of them] were killed. It was in 
Ghana that they started a family.  So the family that you 
have started on that side, where will you bring them to 
resettle them in Liberia?
259
 
 This is just one example of the number of concerns felt by many of those 
considering retuning to Liberia after the camp invasion in March 2008.  After this 
invasion “people started registering and people started going” to Liberia.260  UN-
chartered planes carried refugees on Sundays and Wednesdays from Accra, Ghana direct 
to Monrovia, Liberia.  Others traveled by chartered buses –mostly men- from Buduburam 
to Monrovia, via Cote d‟Ivoire.   
One issue raised during this time period related to UNHCR‟s decision to 
fingerprint those refugees with UNHCR identity cards, due to cases of identity fraud.  
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Those who failed to go through the process were unable to return through UNHCR‟s 
voluntary repatriation program.  This was thought to have affected many people because 
the procedure took place immediately following after the camp invasion during a time 
when many were reluctant to present themselves to any sort of authoritative figure due to 
the tension and feelings of uncertainty in the camp.  Others, who did not have 
identification cards, were able to secure spots in the repatriation program though bribery: 
Because they can‟t go without ID card so some people 
bribed. They had a neighborhood watch team who were 
over the repatriation with the Ghanaians.  So you‟ll go and 
you‟ll bribe; you‟ll give the neighborhood watch team 
money.  When you give them money you can go with that 
ID card which is not yours.
261
 
8. Back “Home” in Liberia 
 
UNHCR‟s repatriation programs resumed quickly after the camp invasion and 
subsequent arrests.  It was an extremely overwhelming and emotional time for all as the 
situation in the camp had deteriorated so rapidly that the quick shift from the protests to 
the repatriation programs caught many off guard.  Within weeks former refugees found 
themselves back in Liberia.  After signing the repatriation forms with UNHCR, most left 
within a matter of days or, in some cases, weeks which left them with very little time to 
mentally or financially prepare for their return.
262
  As one female participant put it, 
“Peace in Liberia is another thing but going back home and not having anywhere to start 
is another thing.”263  This sentiment exhibits the general feeling for most Liberians as to 
why they were not ready to repatriate in the first place.   
Only one participant, a female, discussed what it was like for her and her family 
back at home in Liberia.  She had spent most of her life in Ghana as she fled Liberia 
when she was very young.  She was hesitant to return with her husband and two children 
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because she no longer knew Liberia, having spent fifteen years in the camp.  At that point 
she and her husband had established a life in the camp.
264
  However, promises of 
opportunities for returnees made by UNHCR during the repatriation process gave her 
some sense of relief and hope upon their return.  Some of these promised opportunities 
included skills-training, job sponsorship, educational opportunities and assistance in 
obtaining a driver‟s license.  However, as she noted, and was later confirmed by a second 
participant, “We didn‟t benefit anything from the UN.”265  They tried to pursue all the 
opportunities that were promised to her and her family but they did not successfully 
obtain anything.   
The UN said that if we come back home they will give you 
this.  If you have a career they will sponsor you.  Nothing!  
For me, I didn‟t see anything. They said they had a driving 
program and we ran after it.  Nothing!  They said if you are 
qualified in this area they will provide some finances and 
things for you.  We ran behind it.  Nothing!  They said they 
were giving loans but they didn‟t give anything.  For me, I 
didn‟t see any of it so I don‟t see like it was true.  So we 
just decided to stay home and just do what we can do until 
we can do something for better living.
266
 
While this participant was clearly disappointed and discouraged it did not affect 
how she felt about being back home.  It was apparent that even with disappointment that 
these promises of help and assistance were unfulfilled she was happier to be back in 
Liberia and to no longer be in Ghana.“We were in a foreign land and they didn‟t treat us 
well.  So it is better that I die in my home than to die elsewhere, where I won‟t have a 
grave or where nobody will ever know about me.”267 One of the male participants 
concluded his narrative by declaring: “It‟s not like you get bread from heaven but at least 
you feel safe because you‟re home.  You go anywhere you wanna go and nobody will ask 
you, „Who are you?‟”268  
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 These sentiments express the refugees‟ overall thoughts on their time in Ghana 
and their happiness to be back in Liberia.  While the conditions in Liberia are not ideal, 
they are much better than what they had been and are improving.  More importantly, 
these former refugees feel safe and they feel safe not only because the civil conflict in 
their home country has ended but they are no longer in a foreign land where everything 
was unattainable and safety was nonexistent.  While home might be an ambiguous 
concept, especially in refugee law where many refugees are unable to return to the place 
of their former inhabitance, they are in a land with their own laws and customs and are 
treated with greater respect in dignity than when they were in Ghana. 
E. Narrative Conclusion 
Some Liberian refugees lived in the camp for almost two decades.  While 
Buduburam had a strong sense of community and developed structures to create a sense 
of normalcy in the camp, the time spent was ultimately a waiting game.  Some waited for 
resettlement opportunities while others waited until it was evident that the security 
situation in Liberia had improved and they had opportunities to acquire skills or save 
money.
269
 
Voluntary repatriation is based on the idea of “voluntariness;” however, there is 
no system to measure the “voluntariness” of decisions to repatriate.  There is a lack of 
established mechanisms to determine under what conditions refugees are truly making 
the decision to repatriate.  As one returnee said, “The repatriation was voluntary, sure, but 
look because of the tension.”270  The coercive methods used by the Ghanaian government 
left Liberian refugees with no other choice but to repatriate.  As one participant 
emotionally said, “Living as a refugee is like living in hell with the devil himself; 
Especially in Ghana.”271  While Liberians may not have been ready to go home, no 
matter what the conditions in Liberia were like they could no longer compare to the 
conditions in Ghana, living in fear and wondering who would be victimized next.    
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 The following are a list of policy recommendations along with some general 
observations and considerations for all stakeholders, not only for the promotion of 
repatriation programs but for the entire international refugee law regime.  Some provide 
methods to address the gaps in the current system, including ways to incorporate the 
refugee‟s subjective perspective, while others address the roles and responsibilities of 
states and UNHCR.  These recommendations do not recognize all the disparities and 
challenges of the refugee law system but they offer a starting point from which all actors 
can work and build-upon in order to diminish any current problems, inequalities and 
irrelevant aspects of its current state.    
 
General Recommendations 
 
 International refugee law instruments must consist of a language which has a 
clearer “meaning of words” with less room for vague and ambiguous terms so that 
there is less freedom for self-interpretation by states.
272
 
 UN member states, along with the assistance of UNHCR and other refugee 
agencies, must seriously re-consider the 1951 Convention and address the 
disparities between its language, its implementation and refugee protection.  This 
might involve the preservation of the current Convention with major adjustments 
or require an entirely new draft.  One key element which must be included in this 
process is the examination of the scope of the Convention and its limit on 
humanitarian aspects, such as human rights. 
 The current framework for repatriation is unable to achieve its core objective.  
There is a need to re-evaluate repatriation in order to clarify its goals.  
o The use of language such as promotion, encouragement, coercion, 
facilitation and persuasion should all be defined within a legal context.  
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The meaning of home is also another term which needs to be legally 
defined since it differs between the state and the refugee.    
o Clear guidelines must be established to outline the role of all stakeholders 
in the repatriation process.  These guidelines must offer a step-by-step 
approach to the various phases of repatriation in order to ensure full 
adherence by states and refugee agencies. 
o The concept of “voluntariness” needs to assume an absolute legal 
character otherwise states will continue to disregard this standard and its 
purpose will cease to be of importance.  While voluntary repatriation is 
currently non-binding, a revision of the 1951 Convention would be able to 
incorporate this issue into the draft, in order to encourage states to adhere 
to this human rights standard.   
o A new approach needs to be taken, with strategic policies, to confront the 
issue of the objective vs. subjective perspectives and their role in refugee 
protection.  The state‟s power over the standards and decisions stemming 
from the 1951 Convention has established a system where protection is 
not afforded to refugees but rather to states and their self-interests. 
 The current role of UNHCR and the application of the 1951 
Convention have created ambiguity surrounding when mandated 
repatriation is indeed legal which must be addressed if repatriation 
is to remain a key solution.   
 There is the need to develop a more effective way to close the gap between the 
emergency relief and longer-term development.
273
  This is of vital importance for 
both the home states and the refugees in the state of asylum.   
 While there is already a discussion surrounding the issue of burden-sharing 
amongst states, there is an urgent need to place more emphasis on creating and 
implementing policies to address this problem.  A solution to this issue could have 
immediate positive changes on the refugee system.
274
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UNHCR 
 
 The 1951 framework of UNHCR does not express the current refugee situation 
and has thus only hindered its “adaption process and created a narrow legal image of the 
institution‟s potential” by applying “post-cold war legal terms” to “modern-day 
situations.” 275  Its current capacity as a political entity is far removed from its original 
mandate and thus not only is the UN overextended but its inattentiveness has further 
allowed for states to deter from their legal obligations.  While there is confusion in the 
global community regarding the role and responsibilities of UNHCR there is clearly 
disorder and a lack of clarity within the agency itself.  This will only prove the agency 
ineffective in the long-run if it does not know realize the threshold of its capabilities and 
responsibilities.  The creation of a new mandate, which reflects the contemporary refugee 
and needs, will establish precise objectives, roles and responsibilities.   
There is a great need for more empirical research to be conducted on returnees in 
order to obtain their voice on the voluntary repatriation experience.  Research will allow 
UNHCR to gain a greater understanding of the current gaps and challenges associated 
with voluntary repatriation.  The results from such studies will allow UNHCR to re-
examine the current framework of durable solutions and attempt to adapt it to this new 
knowledge if it hopes to preserve the refugee law regime.  This will also help to re-
evaluate the current criteria for the improvements in the home country which would 
enable repatriation.  As this paper illustrated, the requirements that would motivate return 
for refugees is very different from those of UNHCR and states.  An immediate approach 
to facilitate discussions on would also have immediate effects in refugee law, specifically 
in the realm of durable solutions.   
Another issue which seems to arise is the nationality of UNHCR staff working 
with the population of concern.  Already host communities can have difficulties 
welcoming and accepting refugee populations.  When one is in the position to make 
important decisions on behalf of a refugee it is important that they do so in an unbiased 
manner.  This does not always seem to be the case and is an important issue that seems to 
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affect UNHCR on a global scale, rather than just country or region specific.  It is a matter 
which should be examined closely in order to ensure that the objectives and the integrity 
of UNHCR are upheld.   
Further recommendations include: 
 The implementation of “education for repatriation” programs in order to teach 
refugees about dispute resolution along with skills to later maintain a 
livelihood.
276
 
 UNHCR should oversee and facilitate voluntary repatriation plans from the 
beginning to the end in order to “monitor the fulfillment of [any] amnesties, 
guarantees or assurances”277 that were promised to the refugees as part of their 
return.
278
  
 UNHCR must facilitate dialogues between Northern and Southern states to 
address burden-sharing amongst all UN members and the 1951 Convention 
signatories and initiate processes and principles related to addressing refugee 
situations and how states can mutually assist each other while providing absolute 
refugee protection. 
 UNHCR should coordinate and facilitate national asylum practices for states in 
order to create a normative framework for all those who seek asylum.   
 Assistance, rather than protection, has come to comprise by far the greatest 
portion of the UNHCR‟s work.  The agency must devise solutions for groups of 
people rather than for individual refugees.
279
   
 
State of Asylum 
  
It is common knowledge that while states may ratify legal instruments they 
usually fail to adhere to their obligations and/or successfully implement their policies.  As 
this paper has demonstrated, the legal instruments of international refugee law are no 
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A method of monitoring promises and guarantees made to refugees by UNHCR should also be 
developed to ensure that returnees obtain the assistance assured to them upon their return home. 
279
supra note 275 at 5. 
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different.  While a discussion regarding the need for states to abide by both international 
human rights and refugee law is obvious it is also known to have little effect on states.  
So while one may not force a state to comply with their obligations it is important for 
discourse to revolve around ways in which refugees and states can mutually benefit from 
one another during the refugees‟ duration of stay in the host state.  If states fully 
understand and recognize the positive effects that granting certain rights to refugees 
would create then perhaps they would be more inclined to consider such benefits.  By 
acknowledging this they would realize that it is in their best-interest to approach refugee 
law in a manner which will result in success rather than increased difficulties and 
problems.
280
   
 States of refuge should also consider the following recommendations: 
 Access to education, skills development and income-generating activities will 
enable refugees to rely less on aid and aid in preparation for their eventual return 
to the home state.  These opportunities create self-reliance which enables refugees 
to rely less on humanitarian and government assistance.  They also create the 
possibility for generating economic opportunities and development in host 
communities.   
 States should facilitate repatriation along with the help and support of the 
UNHCR and other refugee and humanitarian agencies in order to ensure that the 
needs and rights of refugees are addressed through every step of the process 
 States should develop and implement programs or other activities to bring 
together refugee and host communities in order to develop friendlier relationships 
rather than hostile and/or discriminatory ones.  It creates mutual understanding 
and also acts as an educational tool for all participants. 
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For example, a positive and supportive approach for voluntary repatriation will result in a greater chance 
of its durability rather than forced returns which have a greater risk of resulting in renewed refugee flight.  
Approaches such as this, and policies which create such situations, are unsustainable and are of even 
greater detriment to the refugees as well as the host states.    
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State of Origin 
 
 The home state has some of the most difficult and challenging responsibilities as 
it is the one recovering from civil conflict and, as noted, often lacks basic infrastructure 
and services.  Their duty to welcome returnees home and re-instate their protection as 
citizens can be a burden if returnees attempt or are forced to return too soon after the end 
of a conflict.  It is essential that states of origin keep agencies, such as UNHCR and other 
aid organizations, as well as the asylum states informed on their conditions and progress.  
They must also be forthright and clear about their needs and areas where they are facing 
difficulties.   
 Once it has been decided that returnees can successfully return “home” the home 
states must be attentive to the needs of returnees in their transitional and recovery plans.  
They must work closely with states of refuge to facilitate an easier transition for 
returnees.  They need to implement strategic policies and plans for the reintegration of 
returnees.  Home states must assist them in obtaining any necessary documents (birth 
certificates, passports, deeds to land, compensation claims, etc.) so that they may begin 
re-building their lives.  However, states of origin must be practical when creating 
programs or policies, such as the reacquisition of land or property, so that they are fair for 
all nationals.  They should not make promises that they are unable to keep if they desire 
success in the phases of reintegration and national rehabilitation. 
 
Refugees  
 
One of the major gaps in the current organization of refugee law is that the 
individual refugee is not considered an integral part of the international refugee regime.  
By transforming his role from a passive recipient into more of a participatory position 
then he has the ability to aid in some of the burdens that states claim to bear when they 
host refugee populations.  This offers power to the individual to make important 
decisions for himself to not only better his life but to also realize the options that he has, 
rather than waiting around for months or even years for someone to approach him and 
offer or mandate solutions.  Policies affect refugees directly and thus they should be 
involved in all aspects of the decision-making process of the system.   
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 From the onset of protection, refugees should have a clear understanding of what 
their rights are and assistance offered in camps or urban environments should 
offer programs to address this issue.
281
   
 Repatriation assistance must not only reflect the refugees‟ criteria but it must also 
reflect their pace of decision-making.
282
 
 When seriously contemplating repatriation programs refugees should be afforded 
the opportunity to address their concerns in an open forum.  These concerns 
should then be considered by host states and UNHCR who should respond to 
these questions and fears.
283
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 The majority of refugees receive news from indirect sources, other refugees who heard from someone 
else who heard from someone else.  These tend to instigate rumors and lies which spread quickly amongst 
these populations due to their situations.  One way to approach this would be to include legal aid classes as 
a mandatory element to those who are granted refugee status.  A class such as this would help outline what 
it means to be a refugee: legal rights in host state, rights as a refugee, available aid and assistance, 
economic and educational opportunities, possible solutions, etc.  It would also help for refugees to have a 
clear understanding of what is possible and what is not.  The current trend for everyone to wait for 
resettlement is unsettling because so few are actually resettled.  Many miss out on other opportunities, such 
as educational, because they are only waiting to be selected for resettlement.    
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Community gatherings, town-hall style meetings, surveys, personal narratives and interviews are all 
methods in which such a forum could be conducted.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Whether you agree or not that international refugee law is in crisis, one cannot 
deny that its current framework does not reflect the needs of contemporary refugees.  The 
current rift in the refugee system and the various gaps in the standards of protection only 
substantiate the need for states “to stick to the spirit of international instruments [and] 
find a viable solution in an environment [which is becoming] increasingly hostile to 
refugees.”284 From burden-sharing to refugee protection to the principle of non-
refoulement states are becoming increasingly absent in the global refugee problem.  
While states of the North continuously leave Southern states to bear the challenges of 
providing for refugees, the majority of states seek ways to either divert their participation 
or to relinquish their assistance all together.   
Voluntary repatriation may have been considered the ideal solution for the past 
three decades but its increasing transformation from a voluntary character to an 
involuntary one illustrates its inability to continue serving as a durable solution without 
completely disrupting the refugee protection system once and for all.  The current criteria 
for the promotion of voluntary repatriation lack a standard of mechanisms which reflect 
the needs of refugees and human rights norms; provided with the right support refugees 
are the best judges to determine when it is safe to return.  The shift of control from legal 
standards to the state‟s objective perspective has increased the power of the state to 
become the primary decision-maker, creating a disruption in the system.  This puts the 
safety of refugees in danger, deteriorating its intent to provide protection to vulnerable 
individuals.  The state‟s objective perspective cannot be the premise for coercing 
refugees to return nor can it replace the value of the refugee‟s subjective perspective.  
Ignoring the refugee voice increases the likelihood that they will be unable to fulfill the 
requirements for refugee protection, which they may otherwise be eligible for, or remain 
refugees indefinitely, causing even more “burdens” for host states.  The lack of 
consideration of the refugee‟s perspective along with the current ability of states to hide 
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behind its sovereignty to avoid refugee situations enables states to largely ignore their 
obligations to both international refugee law and international human rights law.   
Today‟s refugees “are less often middle-class people who need legal assimilation 
in a second European culture [for whom the 1951 Convention was created] than destitute 
people with a wide variety of special needs.”285  If we are to address the challenges which 
stem from this outdated context then we must be willing to negotiate the terms under 
which it presently exists.  A “fundamental rethinking of norms”286 is necessary to achieve 
the objective of refugee law since current practice clearly illustrates that states do not 
respect the current approach to legal standards of refugee law.  Legal instruments must be 
re-developed under a normative framework to reflect human rights standards and use 
more restrictive language for less state interpretation.  If the system continues to function 
in its present capacity then refugees will continue to find themselves in a state of 
perpetual fear and eternal limbo and refugee law will remain in turmoil. 
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VII. APPENDIX 
 
A. Methodological Approach 
Why a Focus on Former Liberian Refugees? 
This particular community was chosen for the case study in order to address the 
following: 
 This particular community has not experienced research fatigue thus information 
provided may prove to be new and insightful for future situations where refugees are 
at risk of refoulement and acts of hostilities by the host government. 
 There was very little reported on the camp‟s invasion by Ghanaian security forces 
on 17 and 22 March 2008 and the weeks that followed.   
 Few reports or studies exist on how these events in March 2008 affected the 
residents of Buduburam and their situation as refugees in Ghana.   
 It is important to consider the fact that many Liberian refugees feared for their 
lives and believed they were in greater danger if they continued to reside in Ghana 
rather than if they were to return to a still unstable Liberia, thus resulting in 
“voluntary” repatriation. 
 This case study offers a prime example of how host countries often have immense 
influence on the news which reaches the international media sources.
 287
 
  Due to the lack of international press coverage and factual documented accounts 
of the situation in Buduburam, the international community never condemned the 
Ghanaian government‟s actions.  
   
Methodological Approach 
 I conducted narratives with 11 former Liberian refugees in the cities of Monrovia 
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Most of the information released to the international community was fabricated, focusing mainly on a 
report that refugees were protesting naked rather than the motive for the protest in the first place.   
“The media has been rife with inaccurate and contradictory reports, making a clear assessment of the 
situation confusing at best. Neither the government of Ghana nor the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees appears to consider the safety and long-term wellbeing of the refugees as a priority,” as 
described in Megan Sullivan, N.G.O.'s and Concerned Individuals Form Grassroots Campaign to 
Safeguard Human Rights of Refugees in Ghana, World Press (April 2008).  See also BBC News Africa, 
Ghana to Expel Female Protestors, BBC News, (18 March 2008), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7302243.stm). 
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and Buchanan over a 2-week time period in January 2011.  The narratives
288
 included 
individuals with various perspectives and experiences: returnees who participated in a 
repatriation program both before and after 17 March 2008.  I recruited participants 
through former acquaintances from the Buduburam Refugee Camp, known as 
“gatekeepers”.  Each gatekeeper referred me to a participant who was then able to refer 
me to additional participants for the study.  By using this “snowball” sampling technique 
I mitigated any bias responses by being unacquainted with the participants.
289
   
  I conducted informal conversation with each possible participant during the 
recruitment process, before selecting participants, in order to determine whether or not it 
would be appropriate for the participant to partake in the study.
290
  Before each narrative 
session began, I made certain that each individual had a clear understanding of the project 
description as well as the process of narrative inquiry.
291
  Individuals understood that 
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Initially, I planned to conduct a survey but due to the population sample size (Buduburam‟s population at 
the time of the 2008 invasion was around 40,000 and would have required the completion of 400 surveys) I 
decided to conduct  narratives instead.  The purpose of the research was not to obtain a representative 
sample but rather the subjective element to repatriation in the form of the individual refugee perspective.  
By conducting narratives I was able to spend a great deal of time with each individual to hear their stories 
and experiences so that I could acquire the individual‟s full perspective.  It also allowed for follow-up 
appointments as well as a review, with the participant, of their narrative transcript (as described below). 
289
If I had been acquainted with a participant and they were aware of the responses that I sought then they 
may have felt more inclined to frame their responses around this context if they thought it would help me 
with my research.   
290
 Another reason for conducting only eleven narratives is that in the recruitment process for participants I 
needed time to conduct informal conversations with potential participants, as suggested in the literature 
regarding the narrative approach, prior to inviting the participant to participate in the research.  Since 
participants may be unable to see potential consequences, such as susceptibility to negative mood states and 
depression, through these informal conversations I was able to recognize any possible vulnerabilities which 
could have led to possible consequences or harm if the participant had participated.  While I did not believe 
that  my topic of research would lead to such consequences I did want to ensure that all safeguards were in 
place to prevent any harm to the individual participant.  Therefore, I planned that if at any point of the 
recruitment process or during the story-telling phase if a situation involving such vulnerability arose I 
would contact a professional Psychosocial Worker at the Liberian Association of Psychosocial Services or 
another professional if necessary.  Fortunately, such a situation did not arise.  As mentioned in both the 
Smythe and Murray literature and per the suggestion of the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, I 
obtained the contacts for these professionals, such as the Liberian Association of Psychosocial Services, 
prior to my arrival in Liberia. As described in William E. Smythe and Maureen J. Murray, Owning the 
Story: Ethical Considerations in Narrative Research, 10 ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR 313(2000).   
291
The participant must have a clear understanding that a narrative is the process through which they tell 
their story or their experiences through their own perspective.  However, this narration, while told from 
their own perspective, will later be re-narrated, from the researcher‟s perspective.  As Smythe suggested, I 
allowed for time, in this case two days, to pass before conducting the narrative to ensure full consent and 
understanding of what the research process entailed and to ensure that the participant told their own story, 
with their own words and from their own perspective.  Also, individuals understood that no compensation 
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participation was on a completely participatory basis with an emphasis on the need for 
the individual‟s honesty throughout the narrative process.  I retained anonymity by not 
recording any personal details, in order to diminish any security concerns that these 
former refugees may have as well as to minimize the bias within the study‟s results.292  
Furthermore, any participant interested in receiving the results of the study will be given 
the opportunity to receive them.  All observations and interviews were conducted in a 
location of the participants‟ choice to ensure their comfort and safety.293  I assured each 
participant of the importance of confidentiality in this study and presented them with an 
informed consent form for their review and signature; the consent forms were not shared 
with anyone other than me.
294
  I reminded participants that at any point throughout the 
course of the study if they decided to no longer participate then they had the right to 
refrain from participating further and that any information they had provided up to that 
point in time would be discarded.  Participants were not below the age of twenty-one in 
order to ensure that they were legally independent, and not dependents, when they 
repatriated to Liberia.
295
   
 
The Importance of the Narrative Inquiry (Expanded) 
The narrative inquiry is essential as the methodological approach to this study 
                                                                                                                                                 
would be awarded for their participation.  Id.    
292
It was important that the participant was aware that their identity would not be used in the written 
research but that a numbering system, only known to me, would be used in place; any personal and 
demographic information that they revealed was not incorporated so as to protect their identity.  
Furthermore, those who referred me to the participants were not present at any point of the narrative 
process, including the follow-up and review of the transcripts.  Id. 
293
Only the participant and I were present during the course of the narrative, unless he/she wished to have 
someone else present during this time period.  No acquaintances were involved in the actual narrative 
process. 
294
It was highly understood that many participants would be unwilling to sign the form but it was clear that 
their oral consent was suffice to participate in the narrative.  Only two of the eleven participants refused to 
sign the form but did give their oral consent to participation.  Furthermore, while the informed consent does 
not allow for the course of nature that narratives often take, the participant and I relied on the “process 
consent”, which is an on-going understanding of consent that will last through the duration of the narrative 
process.  Therefore, at any time, either during or after the narrative phase, if the participant felt that the 
narrative moved beyond the boundaries from which they were comfortable then they would have been able 
to withdraw their participation and data.  All data, including the consent forms, will be destroyed at the end 
of the 3 year time frame that is required by the IRB.  Thomas Hadjistavropoulos and William E. Smythe, 
Elements of Risk in Qualitative Research, 11 ETHICS & BEHAVIOR 164 (2010). 
295
In order to register for voluntary repatriation an individual had to be of the legal age of 18 in order for his 
or her decision to repatriate to be considered legal.  Those under the age had to repatriate with their parents, 
or other family members, or else did not have the ability to return to Liberia. 
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because the objective is to understand the subjective element of the refugee experience 
through the individual‟s perspective.296  Narratives can be “used to effect cultural change, 
transfer complex tacit knowledge trough implicit communication, construct identity, aid 
education, contribute to sense making, act as a source of understanding, and study 
decision making.”297  Participants are able to talk openly and freely about their 
experiences and the events surrounding their repatriation; they are not confined to the 
boundaries of particular questions as presented in other forms of methodology.  This 
allows room for additional information to be provided which may be useful and insightful 
and may not have been offered otherwise.  The “narrative lends itself to a qualitative 
enquiry in order to capture the rich data within stories”298 and are able to “address the 
ambiguity, uncertainty, complexity and dynamism of individual, group and 
organizational phenomena.”299  Surveys, questionnaires and other types of quantitative 
analyses are unable to capture such information.  While the narrative stories “are 
essentially individual constructs of human experience and can have limitations that may 
affect objectivity,”300 they can offer “different viewpoints and interpret collected data to 
identify similarities and differences in experiences and actions.”301 
 
Approach to Conducting Narratives 
When conducting narrative inquiries the research participant is regarded as a 
collaborator rather than an informant because the researcher does not guide the 
participant with the agenda of the research, such as in other methodological approaches.  
Instead research is conducted through forms of dialogue between the researcher and the 
collaborator (participant) with the research subject as a key participant in the discussion.   
I met with each individual twice, for a period of a couple of hours, with time set 
aside during the two weeks to allow for additional follow-ups if it was necessary.  In 
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Id. The purpose of narrative is not to clarify what the “participants intended to say but, rather, to interpret 
the underlying, implicit meanings behind what they say.”  Such narratives are known as “typal narratives 
because they attempt to subsume individuals and their life experiences within broader types that are of 
theoretical interest to social scientists.” 
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order to illicit information and to create a standard across the group I asked the same 
questions to each participant.  I avoided asking direct questions so that the research 
would remain in the narrative format while focusing on the focal point of my research.  
By asking indirect and open-ended questions I was able to open up the discussion for the 
participant to then begin the process of telling their stories.  Examples of questions asked 
include: 
 Tell me about life in Ghana. 
 Why did you choose to return to Liberia rather than remain in Ghana? 
 Tell me about the repatriation process. 
 
Data Collection Method 
Through the narratives I successfully obtained individual stories and experiences 
from returnees and their time prior to and during the decision-making process in which 
they decide to repatriate back to Liberia.
302
  No personal information was recorded and a 
letter and number system was created (in place of a pseudonym) to refer to individuals in 
the final report.
303
  After the completion of each narrative, I consulted with the participant 
to ensure that their transcript was an accurate reflection of their narration along with a 
transcript of my interpretations from their narrative.
304
  I considered any feedback from 
the participant and incorporated it into the data, if it proved to be of vital importance.
305
  
Any recorded data will be destroyed after a three year time period.   
 
B. 
Informed Consent Form
306 
Hello, 
                                                 
302
In order to retain accuracy I used the assistance of an acquaintance when stories contain cultural 
elements (expressions, phrases) that I was unfamiliar with.  Any of these necessary clarifications were 
made at a time separate from the time period of the narrative to ensure the safety and protect the identity of 
the participant. 
303
Their experiences were hand-written using a numbering system, only known to me, so that only I know 
to which participant the number and corresponding information belong.  It also assists in the preservation of 
anonymity in the unfortunate event that any materials are lost or stolen as there would be no manner of 
tracing the information back to the participant.   
304
If there was a particular topic of concern then a mutual agreement was made before the information was 
changed and thus incorporated into the research, in case the alterations greatly impacted the protection of 
the individual, the researcher and the integrity of the research. 
305
Smythe et al., supra note 290.  This also allows for further protection as the participant has the ability to 
give their final consent to their information begin included in the final research.   
306
This informed consent form was taken from the CMRS Research and Methodology course that I took 
with Dr. Ray Jureidini during the spring semester 2010 and was adapted to fit my research topic.   
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I am a student in the International Human Rights Law Program at the American University in 
Cairo.  For my thesis research I am conducting a study that seeks to understand the perspective of the 
individual refugee during the process of repatriation.  The main aim of this study is to understand the 
conditions and experiences of Liberian refugees in the repatriation process and the role that the Ghanaian 
government played in this processes both prior to and during the process of repatriation.  I am asking for 
your help and cooperation.  I would like to ask you a few questions and listen to your experiences of living 
in Ghana and the process of repatriation.   
During the course of this study, it is possible that the discussion will move towards a topic that 
may be of an upsetting nature.  For this reason, you may stop the interview whenever you wish and the 
information that you have provided will be withdrawn.  Please understand that while you will give your 
personal perspective on your experiences, the information will then by re-narrated from my own 
perspective.  I will allow you to review the transcript of your narrative as well as that of my perspective 
before I include it in my research.
307
  In the final research report all names and demographic information 
will be disguised with pseudonyms so that your identity will be protected.   
When this study has been completed and is in the form of a written document, it will only be made 
available to students and professors at the American University in Cairo.  It is also possible that at some 
later stage the results of the study may be published, however, no individual will be able to be identified in 
that publication, so your anonymity will be preserved. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
 
I have been informed that the records, transcript and/or notes of the interview will be preserved in 
a secure place at the American University in Cairo.  In this context, I agree to give consent that all of the 
information provided by me during this interview can be published.  I want my name to be used / kept 
confidential in any outcomes of this study. 
Date: 
                                                 
307
Smythe et al., supra note 290.  Smythe suggests that the researcher warns the participant that through the 
course of the narrative the path of the storytelling experience may lead in various directions, including 
those which may not have been intended by the participants.  It is up to the researcher to use their intuition 
and judgment to avoid harm and maintain informed consent throughout the process.   
